ANALYSIS: Canada Turns Its Back on Washington and Seeks Allies in Asia

When U.S. Unpredictability Creates Opportunities Elsewhere

There is a cruel irony in the current situation: it is precisely because Donald Trump is so unpredictable—so abrupt in his trade U-turns—that Canada suddenly finds itself with a card to play in Asia. Asian partners are not naive. They know that Washington can, overnight, decide to impose tariffs or renegotiate a trade agreement under the pretext of national security. Against this backdrop of widespread uncertainty, a partner like Canada—predictable, institutionally stable, and respectful of its contractual commitments—becomes a safe haven.

Japan and South Korea, in particular, bore the brunt of the vagaries of Trump’s trade policy during his first term. Threats to defense agreements, pressure to renegotiate free trade agreements, and tariffs imposed on Korean and Japanese steel and aluminum—all of this has left its mark on institutional memory. These countries, too, are seeking to reduce their dependence on a U.S. partner that has become erratic. Carney’s visit therefore comes at a time when the demand for credible alternatives to the United States is particularly strong.

Trump likely believes he is forcing Canada into submission by brandishing the threat of tariffs. In reality, he is pushing his closest neighbor into the arms of Asian competitors who have been waiting for just such an opportunity.

China’s Shadow Over Canada’s Diplomatic Landscape

Of course, it is impossible to discuss a Canadian mission to Asia without addressing the central issue of China. The relationship between Ottawa and Beijing is complex and tense, marked by the fallout from the Meng Wanzhou case and the arbitrary detentions of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig. Canada cannot and will not throw itself into Beijing’s arms to compensate for the rift with Washington. That would be jumping from one dependency to another—and from a predictable dependency to one that is potentially even riskier.

Canada’s strategy therefore appears to target Asian partners other than China: Japan, South Korea, India, and potentially the ASEAN countries. These partnerships offer the advantage of providing genuine diversification without creating a new structural dependency. They also align with a broader trend among allied democracies seeking alternatives to Sino-American polarization. In this context, Canada has a strong case: it is reliable, transparent, and respectful of international law, and it possesses the resources—clean energy, critical minerals, agricultural products—that Asia desperately needs to import.

Critical Minerals, Clean Energy, and Food Security

Canada sits on a colossal wealth of resources whose strategic importance the entire world is beginning to recognize. Critical minerals—lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements—are at the heart of the global energy transition. Electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines—all of these require massive quantities of these minerals, which Canada possesses in abundance. Japan and South Korea, two nations heavily dependent on imports for their raw material needs, are eyeing Canada’s subsoil with barely concealed envy.

Beyond critical minerals, Canada is an agricultural giant. Grains, canola, pork, beef, and seafood: Canadian agri-food production can feed hundreds of millions of people in Asia. India, in particular, with its population of 1.4 billion and its growing need for food security, represents a market of paramount importance. Not to mention energy: Canadian liquefied natural gas, transported via infrastructure just waiting to be developed, could replace less reliable supplies for Asian countries seeking to secure their energy independence.

Canada isn’t begging for trading partners. It is offering what the whole world lacks: critical resources, food, and energy—all within a framework of predictability and respect for the rule of law that is becoming a rare commodity in international politics.

The Infrastructure Challenge: Connecting Canada to Asia

Canada’s wealth of resources is not enough, however. For these resources to reach Asian markets, massive infrastructure is needed: pipelines, LNG export terminals, deep-water ports, and logistics corridors. This is one of the major challenges facing Canada’s Asia strategy. For years, infrastructure projects for exports to the Pacific have been slowed down, blocked, or abandoned for political, environmental, or logistical reasons. If Canada is serious about capitalizing on Asian interest in its resources, it will have to get these projects moving with a renewed sense of urgency.

The Trans Mountain Pipeline, finally brought online after years of controversy, is a first step. But many more will be needed. The development of LNG terminals on the coast of British Columbia, the expansion of port capacity in Vancouver and Prince Rupert, and the modernization of rail corridors to the Pacific coast: all of this amounts to a massive investment agenda that the Carney administration will have to support both politically and financially. Asian partners are ready to invest in this infrastructure—but they need to see concrete evidence of Canada’s political will.

Tokyo and Ottawa: A Deep Strategic Convergence

Among Carney’s Asian destinations, Japan holds a special place. The two countries share fundamental values: liberal democracy, the rule of law, a market economy, and a commitment to multilateralism. Both are members of the G7, both are partners in the CPTPP—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—and both face similar challenges amid current geopolitical turbulence. The Canada-Japan relationship does not need to be invented: it exists, it is strong, and it is waiting to be expanded.

What Japan wants from Canada is primarily energy and critical minerals. Tokyo has been fixated on its energy security since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which led to the shutdown of most of its nuclear power plants and increased dependence on hydrocarbon imports. Canadian LNG is seen as a stable and reliable alternative to supplies from the Middle East or elsewhere. As for critical minerals, Japan—which produces electric vehicles and high-tech electronic components—has a vital need to secure its supply chains. Canada can meet both of these needs.

The Canada-Japan relationship is perhaps the most natural and obvious of all the new alliances Canada can build in Asia. Two stable democracies, two complementary economies, two countries that have everything to gain by drawing closer in a world that is becoming increasingly fragmented.

Obstacles to Overcome for a Stronger Trade Relationship

But even with Japan, the road is not without obstacles. Canadian farmers and Japanese industries sometimes have conflicting interests in trade negotiations. The issue of Japanese agricultural tariffs—which have for centuries protected a domestic agricultural sector considered a pillar of Japanese society and food security—will remain a point of friction. Similarly, negotiations on foreign direct investment in Canadian natural resources sometimes run up against considerations of Canadian national sovereignty that Carney will need to handle with tact.

These challenges are surmountable, but they require patience, perseverance, and high-level economic diplomacy. This is precisely where Carney’s expertise as a former central banker can make a difference. He knows that major deals are not concluded in a single trip. This first visit to Japan is, above all, about sending a signal, building trust, and laying the groundwork for more substantive negotiations.

India: An Unpredictable but Indispensable Giant

Relations between Canada and India have experienced significant turbulence in recent years. The Hardeep Singh Nijjar case—the murder of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil, in which the Trudeau government implicated Indian government agents—triggered a serious diplomatic crisis, resulting in the mutual expulsion of ambassadors and a marked cooling of bilateral relations. Carney thus inherits a damaged relationship that he must simultaneously repair and move forward.

Yet India is too important to be ignored. With the world’s largest population since 2023, one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and an expanding middle class that is consuming and importing more and more—the figures are staggering. Canada also shares a unique human connection with India: the Indo-Canadian diaspora, numbering more than 1.8 million people, serves as an invaluable cultural, economic, and political bridge. Canadian businesses with Indian roots know both markets, speak both languages, and understand both systems. This is a considerable asset.

The Canada-India relationship is one of the most complex that Carney will have to navigate. Too much distance, and Canada misses out on one of the greatest trade opportunities of the century. Too much closeness to a Modi regime with questionable democratic practices, and it betrays its values. Striking the right balance will be a delicate task.

South Korea: A Laboratory of Commercial Modernity

South Korea represents a different kind of partner—one that is less prominent in Canadian public discourse but has the potential to be highly fruitful. Seoul is a high-tech economy whose companies—Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK Group—are at the forefront of the industries that will define the 21st century: semiconductors, batteries, electric vehicles, and artificial intelligence. These industries have a massive need for the critical minerals that Canada possesses. The deal is almost too obvious: Canada supplies the raw materials, and South Korea transforms them into high-value finished products.

The two countries are already linked by the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement, in effect since 2015. But this underutilized agreement has never truly reached its potential. The current context of global supply chain restructuring offers an opportunity to breathe new life into it. South Korean investments in Canadian mines, Canadian exports of LNG and canola to South Korea, and technology partnerships in the battery sector: the areas for potential collaboration are numerous and concrete.

A Ready-to-Use Legal Framework to Accelerate Trade

One of Canada’s major assets in its engagement with Asia is its membership in the CPTPP—the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. This free trade agreement, which brings together eleven Pacific Rim countries—including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Mexico, Chile, and Peru—represents a combined market of more than 500 million consumers and accounts for approximately 13% of global GDP. It is a ready-to-use legal, regulatory, and commercial framework that Canada has not yet fully leveraged.

The CPTPP provides for substantial tariff reductions on thousands of products, as well as common rules on intellectual property, government procurement, investment, and e-commerce. For Canadian companies looking to enter the Asian markets that are members of this agreement, the path is infinitely clearer than it is for competitors outside the pact. This is a benefit of membership that the Carney government should consistently highlight in its presentations to Asian partners.

The CPTPP is one of the most valuable gifts Canada has received from its trade diplomacy during the Trudeau years. Carney must now transform this agreement on paper into actual trade flows, new jobs, and lasting partnerships. The framework is in place. Now it’s time to breathe life into it.

The CPTPP’s Potential Expansion: An Additional Lever

The CPTPP is not set in stone. Several applications for membership are currently being negotiated or reviewed, notably that of the United Kingdom, which has finally joined the agreement. Other Asian countries, including some ASEAN members, are also eyeing this trade bloc. Each new member would expand the trade area in which Canadian companies could operate with tariff and regulatory advantages. For Canada, actively supporting the expansion of the CPTPP is therefore a win-win strategy: it strengthens its relationships with current members and opens up opportunities in new markets.

There is also a geopolitical dimension to this expansion. A larger, stronger, and functioning CPTPP—one that demonstrates that multilateral free trade can thrive without the United States—sends a powerful message to Washington: your absence from the global trade arena creates a vacuum that others are rushing to fill. This may be the best response Canada can offer to Trump’s trade provocations—not through direct retaliation, but through the patient construction of an alternative trade order.

Illusions to Avoid and Realities to Accept

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Canada can, through a few diplomatic trips, offset its dependence on the United States. The reality is much more complex. Geography matters: Canada is physically adjacent to the United States, and this proximity creates logistical and cost advantages that no Asian partner can match. North American supply chains are deeply integrated in sectors such as the automotive and electronics industries: there is simply no credible Asian alternative in the short term for these industries.

Trade diversification toward Asia is therefore a long-term endeavor. It requires considerable investment in infrastructure, market research, business training, and trade diplomacy. It also demands sustained political will across several successive terms in office—which is difficult in any democracy. And it must be pursued in parallel with—not instead of—the ongoing management of relations with Washington, however difficult those relations may have become.

Trade diversification isn’t a switch you can simply flip. It’s a generational undertaking. Carney can lay the first stones, but it will be his successors who will see the edifice rise. The real question is: Do Canadians have the patience and vision to commit to this long-term project?

The Risk of Scattering Efforts: Trying to Do Everything at Once

Faced with the American threat, the temptation is to diversify in all directions simultaneously—Asia, Europe, Latin America, Africa. But a country’s diplomatic, trade, and financial resources are limited. Spreading oneself too thin across too many fronts at once risks diluting efforts without producing tangible results anywhere. The Carney administration will therefore have to make strategic choices: Which Asian markets should be prioritized? In which sectors should efforts be concentrated? Which diplomatic and financial tools should be mobilized?

Current indications suggest a focus on Japan, South Korea, and India—markets Canada is already familiar with, and with which it has existing agreements or established relationships. This is a pragmatic approach that fits well with Carney’s temperament: building on existing foundations rather than starting from scratch, deepening established relationships rather than pursuing numerous new ones, and maximizing results per unit of diplomatic effort invested. This is sound strategic management.

CETA: An Underutilized Agreement and an Overlooked Pillar of Diversification

Amid all the talk about Carney’s Asian mission, it is sometimes forgotten that Canada already has a major diversification tool on the Atlantic side: the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, better known by its acronym CETA. Provisionally entered into force in 2017, this agreement theoretically opens up a market of more than 450 million consumers to Canadian companies, with significantly reduced tariffs on a wide range of goods and services.

However, CETA remains largely underutilized. Many Canadian companies, especially SMEs, are unfamiliar with the agreement’s mechanisms or do not know how to benefit from it. Trade flows between Canada and Europe have certainly increased since the agreement was signed, but not as much as hoped. A serious diversification strategy should include a massive effort to fully activate CETA alongside expansion into Asian markets. The two approaches are complementary, not competitive.

Canada has free trade agreements with markets representing more than half of global GDP. And yet, it has put almost all its eggs in the American basket. This is less a strategy than a habit. And habits, even the most comfortable ones, can become traps.

Canada-Europe Coordination in the Face of Trump: A Natural Alliance

Beyond trade, the Canada-Europe relationship has a geopolitical dimension that is taking on new importance in the current context. Faced with a Trump who is calling transatlantic alliances into question, threatening to pull out of NATO if Europeans do not pay more, and treating his allies with the same contempt as his adversaries—Canada and Europe share a common interest in maintaining a rules-based international order. They also share concerns that the United States may become a less reliable partner, or even a source of instability.

This geopolitical convergence could fuel enhanced economic cooperation. Canada and Europe could coordinate their responses to U.S. tariffs, their investments in critical technologies, and their policies on the procurement of strategic minerals. This would be an alliance of trading democracies standing up to U.S. unilateralism—a powerful signal sent to Washington that its allies will not remain passive indefinitely.

SMEs and Large Corporations: Two Very Different Realities

Diplomatic announcements and trade agreements, as impressive as they may be on paper, are only valuable if Canadian companies are capable and willing to capitalize on them. And that’s where the picture becomes more nuanced. Large Canadian corporations—in the energy, mining, financial technology, and telecommunications sectors—generally have the resources and expertise to navigate complex Asian markets. They have dedicated international teams, specialized lawyers, and networks of contacts. For them, a strong political signal from Carney may be enough to get stalled projects moving again.

The situation is very different for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which nonetheless form the backbone of the Canadian economy. Exporting to Asia is a complex, costly, and risky undertaking for an SME with 200 employees based in Alberta or Quebec. Language barriers, a lack of understanding of Asian business cultures, regulatory differences, logistics costs, and payment delays—all of these represent real challenges that SMEs cannot overcome on their own. The government will need to implement structured guidance, support programs, and financing initiatives if the Asia strategy is to benefit the entire Canadian economy.

A trade strategy that benefits only large companies is politically and economically inadequate. The true success of diversification into Asia will be measured by the number of Canadian SMEs that have found new customers in Tokyo, Seoul, or Mumbai.

Training, Cultural Adaptation, and Language: The Invisible Challenges

There is one aspect of trade diversification toward Asia that political announcements never mention, yet which largely determines success: intercultural competence. Doing business in Japan is not the same as doing business in South Korea or India. Every Asian business culture has its own codes, hierarchies, decision-making rhythms, and ways of negotiating and building trust. Sending delegations of Canadian businesspeople to Asia without adequate intercultural preparation is a waste of valuable resources.

The issue of language is particularly acute. While English is the language of international trade and allows one to function in most Asian business environments, the ability to communicate in Japanese, Korean, Hindi, or the languages of ASEAN represents a considerable competitive advantage. Canadian universities, general and vocational colleges, and vocational training programs should receive significant investment to develop these linguistic and cultural skills, which are essential to the government’s Asia strategy.

Carney Faces Canadian Public Opinion

Carney’s Asian tour also has a domestic political dimension that cannot be ignored. The Prime Minister must demonstrate to Canadians that he is capable of taking action in the face of American threats—that Canada is not a passive victim of Trump’s whims, but a sovereign actor capable of forging its own economic destiny. In this context, images of Carney shaking hands in Tokyo or Seoul, signing memoranda of understanding, and announcing trade agreements—all of this carries considerable domestic political weight.

Canadian public opinion was deeply shocked by Trump’s statements about annexing Canada. What was perceived as an absurd provocation turned out to be an attack on Canada’s national identity that citizens felt viscerally. Demonstrating that Canada can not only withstand this pressure but also turn it into an opportunity to reinvent itself commercially—that is exactly the kind of narrative Carney needs to consolidate his political authority and prepare the country for the difficult economic reforms ahead.

There is something deeply Canadian about this response to Trump: no shouting, no outbursts, no dramatic confrontation. Just a suitcase, a plane ticket to Asia, and the work that quietly begins. It may be the most effective form of resistance there is.

National Unity as a Prerequisite for Success

The strategy of diversifying into Asia can only succeed if Canada speaks with one voice. Yet Canadian politics is complex, federal in nature, and rife with deeply entrenched regional tensions. Alberta, a resource-rich province, has a very different vision for Canada’s energy future than Quebec or British Columbia. The interests of resource-producing provinces are not always aligned with those of manufacturing or service-based provinces. And tensions between Ottawa and certain provincial capitals can undermine the coherence of Canada’s message on the international stage.

Carney will therefore have to pursue two diplomatic strategies simultaneously: one toward Asia, the other toward the Canadian provinces. Ensuring that each has a stake in the diversification strategy, that economic benefits are distributed equitably across the country, and that dissenting voices are heard and incorporated—this is a political task as crucial as the trade negotiations themselves. A divided Canada cannot be a credible partner for Asian countries that expect consistency and institutional stability.

A historic turning point that calls for collective courage

In the long history of Canadian trade relations, Mark Carney’s trip to Asia could well mark a turning point. Not because it will change everything immediately—agreements are negotiated slowly, and trade flows shift over the course of years—but because it symbolizes a collective realization: Canada can no longer afford to rely on American goodwill as the sole guarantee of its prosperity. What once seemed to be an immutable cornerstone of Canada’s economic strategy is now proving to be a structural vulnerability. And acknowledging a vulnerability is always the first step toward overcoming it.

Asian partners are watching Canada with genuine interest and real expectations. They see a stable, resource-rich country that is reliable in its commitments and capable of providing them with what they need. They also see a country that is still hesitant, that sometimes lacks ambition in its infrastructure projects, and that has been talking about diversification for decades without ever fully taking action. Carney’s mission must serve to dispel these doubts, to demonstrate that this time, the political will is genuine and enduring.

Canada has always been a country defined in part by its neighbors—first the British Empire, then the United States. Perhaps it is time for Canada to begin defining itself on its own terms, for its own sake, toward the Pacific that has always awaited it. This trip to Asia is not an escape. It is an emancipation.

What History Will Remember About This Moment

In ten or twenty years, when historians analyze the Canadian trade shift of the mid-2020s, they may note that it was Donald Trump, paradoxically, who served as the catalyst for a transformation that Canada should have undertaken long ago. By forcing Ottawa to look beyond Washington, by making a dependence—which everyone knew was excessive but which no one had the courage to challenge—unbearable, Trump’s unpredictability may have done Canada an unintended favor by pushing it toward a long-delayed commercial and strategic maturity.

This maturity is not guaranteed. It depends on difficult choices, massive investments, and a national cohesion that is constantly threatened by the centrifugal forces of Canadian federalism. It also depends on a global geopolitical context that could change again—rapidly and unpredictably. But Carney’s trip to Asia says something important about the direction Canada is choosing. And that direction, for the first time in a long while, looks toward a horizon broader than just the southern border.

By Jacques Pj Provost