ANALYSIS: NATO Rejects a Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — and Trump Discovers the Limits of Intimidation Among Allies

Tehran watches and smiles

From Iran’s perspective, this European refusal is an unexpected strategic windfall. For months, Iranian diplomats have been working to widen the rift between Washington and its allies. Every unilateral statement by Trump, every uncoordinated threat, every ultimatum issued without prior consultation with the Europeans—all of this feeds into the Iranian narrative that the United States is an isolated empire that talks tough but acts alone.

NATO’s refusal to join the blockade confirms this narrative with a force that all of Tehran’s propaganda could never have produced on its own. It is not Iran that says the Americans are alone—it is America’s allies who demonstrate this through their actions.

Iran’s capacity for retaliation is no bluff

And yet, beyond diplomacy lies the stark military reality. Iran possesses anti-access capabilities in the Persian Gulf that would send chills down any admiral’s spine. Anti-ship missiles deployed along the coast, fast attack craft capable of swarm attacks, thousands of underwater mines, naval drones—an entire arsenal designed specifically to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a death trap for any naval force attempting a blockade.

The Europeans have read the reports. They are familiar with the Pentagon’s simulations—the ones showing that an open conflict in Hormuz could cost ships and lives and trigger an oil crisis that would make the 1973 crisis look like a minor inconvenience. They have done their calculations. And their calculations say: not us, not now, not like this.

The tanker war never really ended

Between 1984 and 1988, the Persian Gulf was the scene of a silent war against maritime trade. During the Iran-Iraq War, 546 commercial vessels were attacked. Oil tankers went up in flames, crews were massacred, and marine insurance premiums skyrocketed. The United States had launched Operation Earnest Will to escort Kuwaiti tankers—and this led to direct clashes with Iran, including the accidental downing of Iran Air Flight 655, which killed 290 civilians.

This precedent haunts European military leaders like a ghost that cannot be exorcised.

A blockade is an act of war under international law. This is not an opinion; it is a legal reality codified since the 19th century. Proposing a blockade without a UN mandate is tantamount to proposing a war—and Europeans are not willing to go to war against Iran simply because Donald Trump is a poor negotiator.

When Suez Meets Hormuz in Strategic Memory

The British, in particular, carry the scar of Suez in 1956 in their institutional memory. That military adventure in the Middle East, carried out without American support, signed the death warrant of the British Empire as an autonomous world power. The irony is stinging: in 1956, it was Washington that forced London to back down. In 2025, it is London that refuses to follow Washington into a similar adventure.

The roles have been reversed. And this reversal says something fundamental about the state of American leadership in the world.

Maximum pressure, minimum allies

The strategy of maximum pressure against Iran is not new. Trump launched it during his first term by unilaterally withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018—an agreement that the Europeans had spent years negotiating, an agreement that was working according to the IAEA, an agreement that Trump tore up simply because it bore Obama’s name.

Seven years later, the consequences of that decision continue to snowball. Iran is enriching uranium to 60%, its centrifuges are running day and night, and its stockpiles of fissile material are approaching the military threshold. Maximum pressure has not produced a better deal—it has produced an Iran that is closer to the bomb, more distrustful, and better armed.

And now, Trump is proposing to make matters worse by adding a naval blockade to this stack of strategic errors. Europeans look at this track record and ask themselves: Why should we follow a leader who has led us into this dead end?

NATO Is Not a Vending Machine for Solidarity

There is a fundamental misunderstanding of what NATO is at the heart of Washington’s approach. The alliance is not a tool of U.S. foreign policy that can be activated on demand. It is not a force multiplier serving the White House’s unilateral objectives. It is—in theory, at least—an alliance of sovereign nations that decide together on their military commitments.

Trump treats NATO like a subscription service: he pays (too much, in his view), so he should be able to order whatever he wants. This transactional view ignores the fact that the allies have their own parliaments, their own public opinions, and their own strategic interests—and that these interests do not always align with those of a U.S. president who governs on impulse and via tweet.

The True Cost of a Blockade That No One Calculates Publicly

Twenty-one million barrels per day. That’s the volume that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Block that flow for a week—just one week—and the price of a barrel of oil will exceed $150. Block it for a month, and the global economy will enter a technical recession. Europe, which still depends heavily on hydrocarbons from the Gulf despite its energy transition, would be the first collateral victim of a blockade it is being asked to help administer.

There is something obscene about this proposal: asking countries to actively participate in an operation that would destroy their own economies. It’s like asking someone to saw off the branch they’re sitting on—with a smile, if possible.

China and India: Absent from the Debate but Not from the Equation

And then there’s the Chinese elephant in the room. China imports about 70% of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S. blockade of this strait would be perceived in Beijing not as an action against Iran, but as an action against China. The implications are staggering: turning a regional confrontation into a confrontation between the world’s two leading powers, with the most strategic strait on the planet as the battlefield.

India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, would also be hit hard. New Delhi maintains complex relations with Tehran—the Iranian port of Chabahar, developed by India, is a strategic investment worth several billion dollars. A blockade of Hormuz would force India to choose sides, which is precisely what India’s policy of “multi-alignment” seeks to avoid.

The Europeans have understood what Washington seems to be ignoring: a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would not isolate Iran—it would isolate the United States.

What the Law Says When the Cannons Fire

Under international law, a naval blockade is an act of war. The 1856 Declaration of Paris and the 1909 London Convention are unambiguous on this point. Without a United Nations Security Council resolution, a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be illegal—and Russia and China, as permanent members of the Council, would obviously veto any resolution authorizing such action.

Legal experts at European foreign ministries have issued clear memos: participating in an illegal blockade would expose European countries to lawsuits before the International Court of Justice, claims for compensation for economic damages, and a loss of credibility as defenders of the rules-based international order.

And yet, that very credibility is precisely what Europeans invoke when they call on Russia to respect international law in Ukraine. Participating in an illegal blockade against Iran would amount to saying: international law applies to our enemies, but not to us. Europeans have rejected this hypocrisy.

The Montego Bay Convention and Freedom of Navigation

The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 38 guarantees the right of transit passage to all vessels. Blocking this passage constitutes a violation of a convention signed by 168 countries. Europeans cannot claim to defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea while violating it in the Persian Gulf.

This legal consistency is not a technical detail—it is the very foundation of post-1945 European foreign policy. Europeans have built their international identity on respect for multilateral institutions and international law. They are not willing to sacrifice this legacy to satisfy the whims of a president who regards international law as an optional suggestion.

What the Rejection Reveals About NATO’s True State

This refusal regarding Hormuz is not an isolated incident. It is the most visible symptom of a structural crisis that has been undermining NATO since Trump returned to power. European allies have a growing list of grievances: U.S. threats to withdraw, blackmail over defense spending at 2% of GDP, the questioning of Article 5, and negotiations with Putin without consulting the Europeans.

Each of these episodes has further eroded transatlantic trust. And trust, in a military alliance, is not a luxury—it is the lifeblood. Without it, treaties are mere paper, commitments are mere words, and promises of mutual defense are nothing but wishful thinking.

A European Defense Policy: Fantasy or Imminent Necessity

Paradoxically, this refusal is fueling a debate that Europeans have been putting off for decades: that of strategic autonomy. If NATO can be exploited for unilateral military adventures, if Washington can turn the alliance into a tool of coercion in the service of its own objectives, then Europeans must be able to say no—and they must have the military means to say no credibly.

Emmanuel Macron’s France has been pushing this line of reasoning for years. Germany is resisting—but its resistance is waning. The refusal regarding Hormuz could mark the moment when European defense moves from the realm of academic discussion to that of an existential necessity.

The Ghost of Colin Powell Haunts the Gulf

In 2003, Washington asked its allies to join a coalition to invade Iraq. France and Germany refused. The United Kingdom agreed. Twenty-two years later, the toll is devastating: no weapons of mass destruction, hundreds of thousands of deaths, a Middle East destabilized for a generation, and American credibility permanently damaged.

In British political memory, Tony Blair remains the man who followed Bush into Iraq. That memory is toxic. No European leader wants to be the “Tony Blair of Hormuz”—the one who believed Washington, the one who committed his troops based on a flawed strategic analysis, the one who paid the political price for decades.

The shadow of Iraq is the best protection Europeans have against American military adventures.

The Difference Between a Coalition of the Willing and a Forced Alliance

Bush at least had the diplomatic decency to present the invasion of Iraq as a “coalition of the willing.” Trump, on the other hand, seems to view NATO as a coalition of the compelled. The distinction is crucial. A coalition of the willing accepts refusals. A coalition of the compelled punishes them.

And therein lies the real danger: not in the refusal itself, but in Washington’s reaction to that refusal. Will Trump punish recalcitrant allies? Will he scale back security guarantees? Will he threaten to withdraw troops from Europe? Any reprisal would reinforce the narrative that NATO is no longer an alliance but a system of vassalage.

Strategic Patience as a Weapon

Tehran practices strategic patience the way others practice blitzkrieg. Iran doesn’t need to win a naval battle—it needs time to work in its favor. Every month that passes without a nuclear deal brings Iran closer to the nuclear threshold. Every European refusal to follow Washington weakens the anti-Iran coalition. Every escalation of tension drives up the price of oil, which enriches Tehran.

The blockade proposed by Trump is, from Iran’s perspective, a trap that America is setting for itself. If Washington blocks the Strait of Hormuz alone, it is isolated. If it backs down, it is humiliated. If it negotiates after having threatened, it has lost its leverage. In all three cases, Iran wins.

The network of proxies remains intact

And even if a blockade were put in place, Iran would retain its asymmetric capabilities. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen—this entire network of proxies can strike at American and European interests far beyond the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis have already demonstrated their ability to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea with relatively modest means. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would give them a pretext to dramatically intensify these attacks.

The Europeans have factored this dimension into their calculations. A blockade would not isolate Iran—it would open up multiple fronts. And Europe, with its commercial ships transiting the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, would be on the front lines of these reprisals.

Blocking the Strait of Hormuz—to achieve what, exactly?

That’s the question missing from this entire debate: What is the political objective of the blockade? To force Iran back to the negotiating table? Tehran is already there—it’s Washington that’s setting unacceptable conditions. To prevent Iran from enriching uranium? The blockade wouldn’t change a thing—the centrifuges are inside the country, not on ships. To bring about regime change? Forty-six years of sanctions have failed to bring down the Islamic Republic.

A blockade without a clear political objective is not a strategy—it is provocation disguised as foreign policy.

The Europeans asked Washington this question. The answer they received did not convince them. And when your allies don’t understand why you want to do something, there are two possibilities: either you’re not explaining it well, or there’s nothing to explain.

The Failure of U.S. Strategic Communication

The Trump administration has not only failed to convince its allies—it has failed to consult them. According to several European diplomatic sources, the proposal for a blockade was presented as a fait accompli, not as an open question. The allies were informed, not consulted. They received instructions, not invitations.

This approach betrays a profound misunderstanding of alliance diplomacy. You don’t ask sovereign nations to risk the lives of their sailors with a 15-minute PowerPoint presentation and a 48-hour ultimatum. You build consensus, share risk assessments, and negotiate the terms of engagement. None of that was done.

For Washington: The Sheriff’s Loneliness

If the United States decides to proceed with the blockade on its own—which remains possible but unlikely—it would be embarking on the riskiest naval operation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Without the logistical support, intelligence, and complementary capabilities of European navies, the U.S. 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain, would have to cover a vast area on its own, facing an adversary that has spent four decades preparing for exactly this scenario.

The political cost would also be devastating. A president who cannot rally his own allies to his cause projects an image of weakness that neither Tehran, Beijing, nor Moscow would soon forget.

For Europe: Time to Make Choices

The refusal to deploy to the Strait of Hormuz forces Europe to confront its own strategic responsibility. Saying no to Washington is relatively easy. Proposing a credible alternative is infinitely more difficult. If Europe rejects the blockade, what does it propose instead? A return to the JCPOA? Iran has exceeded all the thresholds set by the original agreement. New sanctions? They have never worked on their own. Dialogue? With what leverage?

Europe cannot simply say no. It must say what it proposes instead. And that is where the problem lies—because Europe has never been very good at proposing coherent alternatives when it rejects American initiatives. The “no” to the Iraq War in 2003 was not accompanied by an alternative European strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein. The “no” to Hormuz risks suffering from the same void.

A world where alliances are no longer automatic

Hormuz’s refusal is part of a major trend in 21st-century international relations: the end of automatic alignments. Saudi Arabia is normalizing relations with Iran under Chinese sponsorship. Turkey, a NATO member, is purchasing Russian defense systems. India, a strategic partner of Washington, continues to buy Russian oil despite sanctions. The United Arab Emirates, an ally of the United States, is welcoming massive Chinese investments.

In this multipolar world, no one blindly follows anyone else anymore. Every nation calculates, every nation negotiates, every nation sets its own terms. NATO is no exception to this reality—it reflects it.

The End of a Certain Idea of the West

And yet, beyond strategic calculations, something more fundamental is at stake in Hormuz. It is the very idea of a united, coherent “West” capable of projecting a collective will onto the world. This idea has always been partly mythical—but it had real mobilizing power. It made it possible to contain the USSR, rebuild Europe, and maintain an imperfect but functional international order for seven decades.

In Hormuz, this idea has sprung a leak—and no one seems to have a bucket to plug the hole.

A "no" that is also a call

This European rejection is not an act of hostility toward the United States. It is an act of strategic survival. Europeans are not rejecting the transatlantic alliance—they are rejecting its exploitation. They are not saying that Iran is not a problem—they are saying that a blockade is not the solution. They are not turning their backs on Washington—they are asking Washington to turn toward them.

The nuance is crucial. And it will likely be lost amid the noise of tweets, sensational statements, and binary analyses that will reduce this moment to “Europe is abandoning America.” That is not what is happening. What is happening is that Europe is asking to be treated as a partner, not as a subordinate.

The Western Alliance’s Test of Maturity

If Washington hears this message—truly, beyond the noise—then the Hormuz standoff could become a defining moment. The moment when NATO ceases to be a tool in the service of a single capital and becomes what it claims to be: an alliance of nations equal in dignity, capable of deliberating together before acting together.

If Washington does not hear it—if Trump chooses punishment over listening, ultimatums over dialogue, and contempt over respect—then Hormuz will go down in history as the moment when NATO ceased to be an alliance and became a memory.

The War That Didn’t Happen—For Now

As these lines are being written, the Strait of Hormuz remains open. Tankers are passing through. Oil is flowing. Global trade is breathing a sigh of relief. But this sense of normalcy is fragile—as fragile as the restraint of a president who doesn’t like being told “no.”

NATO’s refusal has likely prevented—for now—a catastrophic escalation. But “for now” is not “forever.” The Iranian crisis is not resolved. The centrifuges are still spinning. Tensions remain at their peak. And a man who thinks in terms of victory and humiliation rather than diplomacy and compromise still holds the U.S. nuclear codes.

What NATO allies said at Hormuz, they may have to say again tomorrow. And the day after tomorrow. And the day after that. Saying no to an angry empire requires courage that must be renewed—because the empire, for its part, never lays down its arms.

Twenty-one kilometers of sea. A furious president. Allies who are holding their ground. And somewhere between the Iranian and Omani coasts, the specter of all the wars we nearly started—and that we could still unleash through arrogance, mistake, or stubbornness.

History will judge whether this European “no” was an act of wisdom or cowardice. But history will also judge those who proposed the blockade. And history, unlike tweets, has a long memory.

Signed, Jacques PJ Provost