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Beijing Accuses Washington of Hacking: The 21st-Century Cold War Has Just Arrived in Latin America

Jacques Pj Provost

2026-06-20 23:39:40

$519 billion: The Numbers That Have Washington on Edge

The figures are staggering. In 2024, trade between China and Latin America reached a record $519 billion. To put that in perspective, it’s more than Belgium’s GDP. More than Sweden’s. It’s a colossal sum that reflects the radical transformation of economic relations in the Western Hemisphere over the past two decades. China has become South America’s top trading partner, surpassing the United States. It is the second-largest trading partner for all of Latin America, just behind Washington. And some economists predict that this figure could skyrocket to over $700 billion by 2035. This is not a passing trend. It is a structural reconfiguration of global trade flows.

But what really worries Washington is not so much the volume of trade as its nature. China isn’t content merely to buy raw materials and sell manufactured goods—even though that is a significant part of the relationship. No, Beijing has developed a much more sophisticated and long-term strategy. It is investing heavily in critical infrastructure: ports, roads, railways, power grids, and telecommunications. It is financing the construction of smart cities, industrial parks, and data centers. It is offering yuan-denominated settlement agreements, currency swap lines, and Panda bonds to reduce dependence on the dollar. In other words, China isn’t just trading with Latin America—it’s weaving a network of economic and financial interdependencies that makes it increasingly difficult for countries in the region to do without it.

The New Silk Road Now Crosses the Andes

More than 20 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean have joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi Jinping’s massive project aimed at recreating the ancient Silk Roads. Colombia announced its participation in May 2025, despite explicit warnings from Washington. Panama, Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil—all have signed agreements under the BRI. For these countries, the appeal is clear: China offers massive financing for infrastructure projects they desperately need, without the political conditions that the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank traditionally impose. No lectures on democracy. No demands for structural reforms. Just money in exchange for contracts.

But this apparent generosity obviously masks strategic calculations. BRI projects give China privileged access to the region’s natural resources—Chilean copper, Argentine lithium, Venezuelan oil, Brazilian soybeans. They create technological dependencies—once Huawei builds your 5G network, it’s hard to do without it afterward. And above all, they establish a physical Chinese presence in strategic locations. Ports built or managed by Chinese companies can serve commercial purposes in peacetime, but also potentially military ones in times of crisis. This is exactly what terrifies American strategists. And this is precisely why Trump decided to strike hard in Venezuela—to send a clear message: Chinese expansion in Latin America has reached its limits.

I must say I’m torn. On the one hand, I can clearly see the trap of Chinese debt. These countries sign lavish contracts and then find themselves unable to repay them, forced to cede control of strategic infrastructure. Sri Lanka and its port of Hambantota are the perfect example. But on the other hand… where was the United States when these countries needed investment? Where was the West when roads, bridges, and power plants needed to be built? China filled a void. And now that it’s established itself, Washington wants to dislodge it with military force. That’s a bit too easy, isn’t it?

Section 3: Venezuela, a Testing Ground for Sino-American Tensions

$106 Billion in Loans: When Caracas Becomes Beijing’s Hostage

Venezuela holds a special place in China’s strategy in Latin America. Between 2000 and 2023, Beijing lent Caracas the astronomical sum of $106 billion, making the South American country the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese loans worldwide. Most of these loans were structured on a “oil-for-loans” basis: China provided the funds, and Venezuela repaid in barrels of crude oil. This arrangement seemed like a win-win when oil prices were high and the Venezuelan economy was relatively stable. But with the country’s economic collapse under Maduro—exacerbated by U.S. sanctions—Venezuela found itself unable to repay its debts. By the end of 2024, its remaining debt to China still stood at around $10 billion.

For China, Venezuela represented much more than just a debtor. It was a strategic partner in a crucial region, a reliable oil supplier (Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves), and, above all, a valuable political ally in international forums. Maduro consistently voted with Beijing at the United Nations and supported China’s positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. Venezuela was one of the few countries to publicly and unreservedly defend the Chinese model. When U.S. special forces landed in Caracas on January 3, 2026, and captured Maduro, China lost more than just a debtor—it lost a key ally and suffered a major geopolitical setback. Hence the severity of China’s reaction.

Venezuelan Oil: An Energy Issue or a Geopolitical Weapon?

Trump was clear about his intentions. During a meeting with the heads of the largest U.S. oil companies on January 9, 2026, he stated that the United States would “manage” Venezuela and “exploit” its oil reserves to “rebuild” the country. His Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, was even more explicit: Washington will use Venezuelan oil as leverage to exert pressure on the new leadership in Caracas. Translation: the oil will be sold, but the revenues will be controlled by the United States, which will decide how and to whom they will be distributed. This is a form of economic tutelage reminiscent of the darkest days of colonialism.

But there is another dimension, less obvious yet just as important. Wang Yiwei, the Chinese professor, suggests that the U.S. thirst for Venezuelan oil is linked to the race for artificial intelligence. The data centers that power AI systems are extremely energy-intensive. China currently produces more than twice as much electricity as the United States and is investing heavily in renewable energy. The United States, on the other hand, relies more heavily on fossil fuels to support its technology industry. Venezuelan oil would therefore not only serve to enrich American oil companies—it would fuel the American technological war machine in its confrontation with China. This is a fascinating hypothesis which, if proven true, would add a whole new dimension to the intervention in Venezuela.

And that’s where we stand. Oil is no longer just about energy or the economy. It has become a weapon in a technological war between superpowers. Every barrel of Venezuelan crude that powers an American power plant is potentially one more AI server running, one more algorithm being trained, and one more technological advantage over China. We are far—very far—from the oil wars of the 20th century. Welcome to the era where fossil fuels are used to power artificial intelligence. The future is truly bizarre.

Section 4: Panama—Trump's Next Target?

The Canal That Shakes Two Empires

While Venezuela was the first warning shot, Panama could well be the next battleground in the Sino-American confrontation. The Panama Canal, that marvel of engineering that connects the Atlantic to the Pacific and through which 14,000 ships pass each year, has become an obsessive fixation for Trump. In his inaugural address, he stated bluntly: “China runs the Panama Canal, but we didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re going to take it back.” This statement caused an uproar among Panamanians and raised concerns among the Chinese. Technically, it’s false—China does not “run” the canal. But in reality, China’s presence in Panama has become so massive that it is now a strategic concern for Washington.

The canal was under U.S. control from its construction in 1914 until 1977, when a treaty provided for its gradual transfer to Panama, which took effect in 1999. Since then, Panama has had full and complete sovereignty over it. But Chinese companies, both public and private, have invested billions of dollars in the country—in the ports at both ends of the canal, in free trade zones, and in logistics infrastructure. Companies such as China Communications Construction Company are building bridges over the canal. Other Chinese firms operate key port terminals. This presence gives Beijing the ability to influence—and potentially disrupt—one of the world’s most strategic maritime routes. And that is something Washington cannot accept.

The Monroe Doctrine in Action: Panama Under Pressure

According to Eric Olander, host of the podcast “The China-Global South Project,” one of the Trump administration’s first moves was to send emissaries to Panama to force the country to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative. Mission accomplished, apparently—Panama caved under the pressure. But this is only the beginning. The United States wants to go further: drastically limit Chinese investment in the country, force the sale of certain assets held by Chinese companies, and above all, ensure that Beijing will never have the ability to block or disrupt traffic through the canal in the event of a crisis. This is a direct application of the Monroe Doctrine: to eliminate any “hostile foreign intrusion” into the Western Hemisphere.

For China, Panama is a test. If Beijing allows Washington to dictate the rules in Panama without reacting, it will send a signal of weakness to all of Latin America. Other countries that have signed agreements with China will begin to wonder whether Beijing can truly protect them from U.S. pressure. Conversely, if China retaliates—economically, diplomatically, or otherwise—the situation risks escalating rapidly. Panama is small, vulnerable, and caught between two giants. And unfortunately for it, it finds itself in the wrong place at the wrong time. The canal that made its fortune could become its undoing if the two superpowers decide to turn it into a battlefield.

My thoughts are with the Panamanians. With the ordinary people living there who are watching their country become a pawn in a game that’s completely beyond their control. They didn’t ask for any of this. They just wanted to develop their economy, attract investment, and improve their infrastructure. And now, they find themselves in the eye of a geopolitical storm. Trump is threatening to “take back” the canal. China is investing billions. And what are they supposed to do? Pick a side and hope they don’t get crushed? That’s the reality of great-power geopolitics. Small countries have no say in the matter.

Section 5: Colombia, Cuba, Mexico: Who's Next?

Bogotá in Washington’s Crosshairs

Colombia made the mistake—from the U.S. perspective—of joining the Belt and Road Initiative in May 2025. A decision that made Washington cringe and immediately placed Bogotá on the list of countries “to watch.” Left-wing Colombian President Gustavo Petro has made a series of overtures toward Beijing: trade agreements, technological cooperation, and infrastructure projects. China was even invited to participate in an astronomy festival in Colombia in March 2024, a sign of the diversifying ties between the two countries. But this growing closeness to Beijing deeply worries Washington, especially since Colombia is traditionally a key U.S. ally in the region, particularly in the fight against drug trafficking.

After Maduro’s capture, Trump explicitly warned Petro that he could be “next.” This was not an empty threat. It was a very serious warning. The United States has several levers of pressure over Colombia: the annual certification of anti-drug efforts (which conditions a portion of U.S. aid), trade agreements, and military cooperation. Washington could easily make life very difficult for Bogotá if the country continues to draw closer to Beijing. But Petro is in a delicate position. On the one hand, he cannot afford to alienate the United States. On the other, China offers economic opportunities that Washington cannot or will not match. This is the classic dilemma of Latin American countries caught between two fires.

Cuba and Mexico: The Obvious Targets

Cuba is a special case. The communist island is a historic ally of China, and Beijing has invested heavily there in recent years—in telecommunications, energy, and infrastructure. For Trump, Cuba represents everything he hates: a communist regime 90 miles off the U.S. coast, backed by China. Wang Yiwei explicitly mentions Cuba as a potential target of the Donroe Doctrine. And frankly, it’s not hard to imagine. The United States has already attempted to overthrow the Cuban regime on several occasions—the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the multiple assassination attempts on Fidel Castro, and the economic embargo that has lasted for more than 60 years. With Trump back in power and determined to drive China out of the Western Hemisphere, Cuba could once again become a priority target.

As for Mexico, the situation is even more complex. The country is the United States’ main trading partner, with trade totaling hundreds of billions of dollars. But China also has a growing presence there, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Chinese companies are setting up operations in Mexico to circumvent U.S. tariffs and gain access to the North American market via NAFTA (renamed USMCA). Washington views this very negatively. Trump has already threatened Mexico with punitive tariffs if it does not limit Chinese investment on its territory. Wang Yiwei goes even further by raising the possibility of a “war with Mexico.” This is likely an exaggeration—a war between the United States and Mexico would have catastrophic consequences for both countries. But it shows just how tense the situation is.

Frankly, the idea of a war between the United States and Mexico seems absurd to me. But six months ago, the idea that the United States would send special forces to capture the president of Venezuela seemed just as absurd. And yet, it happened. So who knows? Perhaps in this world where Trump is resurrecting 19th-century doctrines and China is building a commercial empire in Latin America, nothing is impossible anymore. Perhaps we have truly entered a new era where the rules we thought were set in stone are no longer worth anything.

Section 6: China's Reaction: Between Outrage and Calculation

Wang Yi Speaks Out: “We Do Not Accept the United States Acting as the World’s Judge”

Beijing’s official response was swift and scathing. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called a press conference on January 5, 2026, two days after Maduro’s capture. His words were carefully chosen but unusually harsh by Chinese diplomatic standards: “We have never believed that any country can act as the world’s police, and we do not accept that any nation should set itself up as the world’s judge.” It was a direct and unequivocal condemnation of U.S. action in Venezuela. Wang Yi described the operation as “illegal,” a “flagrant violation of international law,” and a clear “act of intimidation.” China immediately called for Maduro’s release and supported Colombia’s request for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.

But beyond official statements, it was on Chinese social media that anger truly erupted. Platforms like Weibo were flooded with posts denouncing “American colonialism,” “Washington’s piracy,” and “Western hypocrisy.” Videos comparing the intervention in Venezuela to the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan went viral. Memes depicting Trump as a Caribbean pirate circulated widely. And tellingly, content celebrating Maduro’s capture or criticizing the Venezuelan regime was quickly censored. The Chinese Communist Party’s message was clear: on this issue, there is only one acceptable stance, and that is the total condemnation of U.S. action.

Can Beijing really retaliate?

The question now is: what can China do? Specifically, what levers does Beijing have at its disposal to respond to what it perceives as a direct attack on its interests? There is no shortage of options, but none is without risk. Economically, China could restrict exports of rare earth metals to the United States—metals that are essential for the manufacture of smartphones, computers, and weapons systems. This is a weapon Beijing has already wielded in the past, notably during the 2018–2019 trade war. It could also target U.S. companies operating in China, complicating their operations and increasing regulatory scrutiny. Or it could sell off large quantities of U.S. Treasury bonds, which would drive up interest rates in the United States and make it harder to finance the U.S. debt.

But all these options come at a cost to China itself. Restricting rare earths could push the United States to accelerate the development of alternative sources. Targeting U.S. companies risks triggering an escalation that would harm the Chinese economy. Selling Treasury bonds would cause the value of China’s remaining reserves to plummet. This is the problem with economic interdependence: it creates mutual vulnerabilities. Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, suggests that China might instead seek to negotiate an agreement with the United States on the repayment of Venezuela’s debt, in exchange for concessions on other issues. A more pragmatic, less dramatic approach—but perhaps more effective in the long run.

That’s when I realize just how complex the situation is. Because yes, China is furious. Yes, it feels humiliated. Yes, it wants to strike back. But it’s also pragmatic. It knows that escalation could cost it dearly. So it will likely play both sides: issuing scathing public condemnations, conducting discreet behind-the-scenes negotiations, and above all, strengthening its presence in other Latin American countries to show that it won’t be intimidated. That’s the real Cold War of the 21st century. No missiles, no tanks. Just cold calculations, underhanded moves, and lots and lots of money.

Section 7: Latin America, Held Hostage by a War It Did Not Choose

The Dilemma of Countries Caught in the Crossfire

For Latin American countries, the U.S.-China confrontation is a nightmare. For decades, they have been firmly in the U.S. sphere of influence—for better and, above all, for worse. U.S. interventions, CIA-backed coups, and military dictatorships supported by Washington are all part of the region’s collective memory. When China began investing heavily in the 2000s, many Latin American governments saw this as an opportunity to diversify their partnerships and break their sole dependence on Washington. China offered money without political strings attached, infrastructure investments, and favorable trade agreements. It was tempting. Many took the bait.

But now they realize they’ve traded one form of dependence for another. Or worse, that they’ve become dependent on both superpowers simultaneously, which puts them in an even more vulnerable position. Because when Washington and Beijing clash, Latin American countries are forced to choose a side. And whichever side they choose, they’ll alienate the other superpower. If they stay close to the United States, they lose Chinese investment. If they move closer to China, they expose themselves to American retaliation. It’s a zero-sum game where small countries always lose. Eric Olander believes that several countries will now have to “walk on eggshells” when it comes to signing new agreements with China, for fear of drawing the attention—and the wrath—of Washington.

The Temptation of Equidistance: Mission Impossible?

Some countries are trying to play the neutrality card—maintaining good relations with both superpowers without fully aligning with either one. This is the strategy of Brazil, for example, which is both a major trading partner of China and a traditional ally of the United States. Or that of Chile, which has signed agreements with Beijing while maintaining close ties with Washington. But this strategy is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as the confrontation intensifies. Because the United States and China do not want neutral partners—they want allies. They want countries to choose sides. And they are prepared to use every means of pressure at their disposal to force that choice.

The case of Honduras is telling. The country had severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2023 to recognize China, a decision that had provoked Washington’s fury. But after the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, Honduras began to backtrack, signaling that it might reconsider its position. This is exactly the kind of reversal Trump is trying to bring about: to show that U.S. power can force countries to change their allegiance. But it also creates enormous instability. Because if countries are constantly switching sides depending on the balance of power at any given moment, no relationship is stable, no agreement is reliable. It’s a recipe for chaos.

I put myself in the shoes of a Latin American leader. Let’s say I’m the president of a small country. I need investment to develop my economy. China offers me billions to build a port, a highway, or a power plant. I sign the deal. A few years later, Trump shows up and tells me, “If you keep working with the Chinese, I’ll cut you off from the U.S. market.” What do I do? Do I break ties with China and lose the investment? Do I stand my ground and get crushed by U.S. sanctions? There’s no right answer. That’s what’s so terrible.

Section 8: Criticism of Chinese Expansion: Neocolonialism or Development?

The Debt Trap: Myth or Reality?

There is no shortage of criticism of China’s expansion in Latin America. The main accusation is that of the “debt trap”—the idea that China deliberately lends sums that countries will never be able to repay, only to then seize strategic assets as compensation. The most frequently cited example is that of Sri Lanka, which had to cede control of the port of Hambantota to a Chinese company for 99 years after being unable to repay its debts. Could the same thing happen in Latin America? It is a real fear. Venezuela still owes China $10 billion. Ecuador, Argentina, and several Caribbean countries are also heavily indebted to Beijing.

But the reality is more nuanced. First, most Chinese loans have in fact been repaid. Of the $106 billion lent to Venezuela, the bulk has been repaid in oil. Second, the countries that borrow from China do so voluntarily—no one is forcing them. They accept these loans because they need money and Western institutions won’t lend to them, or will only do so under terms they deem unacceptable. Finally, it must be acknowledged that projects financed by China often have a real impact on development: roads built, ports modernized, power plants brought online. It’s not all exploitation. There is also tangible development. The problem is that this development comes with opaque conditions and long-term risks that borrowing countries do not always fully appreciate.

Environmental and Social Standards: China’s Achilles’ Heel

The other major criticism concerns environmental and social standards. Chinese companies operating in Latin America are often accused of failing to comply with local standards regarding environmental protection, workers’ rights, and consultation with local communities. Mining projects that destroy fragile ecosystems. Hydroelectric dams built without consulting indigenous populations. Deplorable working conditions on construction sites. Not all of these accusations are unfounded. There have been documented cases of Chinese companies violating local environmental laws, exploiting workers, and ignoring protests from affected communities.

But here again, we must qualify this statement. Western companies operating in Latin America are not always exemplary either. American and European oil companies have a long history of pollution and exploitation in the region. The difference is that Chinese companies are often less transparent, less subject to public oversight, and less responsive to pressure campaigns by civil society. Above all, they enjoy the unconditional support of the Chinese government, which shields them from international criticism. That is what is concerning: not that Chinese companies are worse than others, but that they are harder to control and less accountable to public opinion.

I have to be honest: I’m deeply ambivalent on this issue. On the one hand, I clearly see the problems posed by China’s expansion: unsustainable debt, environmentally destructive projects, and opaque agreements. But on the other hand, I ask myself: where is the alternative? If China withdraws from Latin America, who will finance the development of these countries? The United States? Europe? The IMF? Everyone who criticizes China should ask themselves this question: what do we propose instead? Because criticizing is easy. Offering a credible alternative is much harder.

Section 9: The Chinese Model vs. the American Model

Two Irreconcilable Worldviews

At its core, what is at stake in Latin America is the clash between two radically different development models. The American model is one of free trade, liberal democracy, human rights, and transparency. In theory, at least. Because in practice, the United States has supported military dictatorships in Latin America for decades, imposed neoliberal economic policies that have impoverished millions of people, and waged illegal wars and carried out covert interventions. The Chinese model, on the other hand, is one of economic development without political conditions, non-interference in internal affairs, and South-South cooperation. In theory, at least. Because in practice, China supports authoritarian regimes, imposes opaque economic conditions, and uses its financial power to buy political influence.

Neither model is perfect. Neither is selfless. The United States and China are pursuing their own strategic interests, and Latin America is merely a battleground in their global confrontation. But there are still important differences. The American model, despite all its flaws, at least in principle includes mechanisms for democratic accountability, transparency, and respect for rights. The Chinese model, on the other hand, is fundamentally authoritarian—it tolerates neither dissent, nor criticism, nor democratic oversight. For Latin American countries, the choice is not between good and evil, but between two forms of hegemony, two types of dependence, two worldviews that both treat them as pawns rather than as full-fledged actors.

Wang Yiwei proposes a solution: “Win-win” with the United States

Interestingly, Wang Yiwei, the Chinese professor who called the United States “pirates,” proposes a surprising solution: that Washington join the Belt and Road Initiative. “BRI projects are very inclusive,” he says. “If you need oil, money, or a way to participate, we can discuss it. It can be beneficial for everyone. Win-win.” It’s a bold, almost naïve proposal. The idea that the United States and China could cooperate in Latin America rather than clash. That Washington could accept China’s presence in the region in exchange for a share of the profits. That the two superpowers could work together on Latin America’s development rather than fight for exclusive control over it.

Obviously, this is a proposal that has zero chance of being accepted by Trump. The U.S. administration does not want to cooperate with China in Latin America—it wants to drive China out. The Monroe Doctrine leaves no room for peaceful coexistence. It’s the Western Hemisphere or nothing. But Wang Yiwei’s proposal is revealing of how Beijing presents itself: not as a conqueror, but as a partner. Not as a threat, but as an opportunity. This is an appealing narrative for Latin American countries, which are tired of being treated like vassals by Washington. Even though, in reality, China is no less hegemonic than the United States—it’s just more subtle in the way it exercises that hegemony.

The idea of Sino-American cooperation in Latin America makes me smile. It’s so… improbable. So contrary to the logic of confrontation that dominates relations between the two countries. And yet, why not? Why couldn’t the United States and China work together on certain projects? Jointly finance infrastructure, share the profits, coordinate their investments? That would be so much more rational than fighting for exclusive control. But rationality has never been the strong suit of great-power geopolitics. Ego, pride, the thirst for domination—that’s what drives the world. Not cooperation. Not “win-win.” Just the will to win, even if everyone loses in the end.

Section 10: Technological Challenges: AI, 5G, and Rare Earth Elements

The Race for Artificial Intelligence Is Redefining Energy Challenges

Wang Yiwei puts forward a fascinating hypothesis: the U.S. appetite for Venezuelan oil may be linked to the race for artificial intelligence. The data centers that power AI systems are extremely energy-intensive. Training a single large language model can consume as much electricity as a small town does over several months. As AI becomes central to the economy and national defense, access to abundant and cheap energy sources is becoming a strategic priority. China currently produces more than twice as much electricity as the United States—about 8,500 terawatt-hours compared to 4,000 for the United States in 2024. And Beijing is investing heavily in renewable energy, with solar and wind capacity skyrocketing.

The United States, on the other hand, is relying more heavily on fossil fuels to support its technology industry. Venezuelan oil would therefore not only serve to enrich American oil companies—it would fuel the American technological war machine in its confrontation with China. Every barrel of Venezuelan crude that powers an American power plant potentially means one more AI server running, one more algorithm being trained, and one more technological advantage over China. This is a hypothesis that, if proven true, would give the intervention in Venezuela an entirely new dimension. We would no longer be in a simple, old-fashioned oil war, but in a 21st-century technological war where fossil fuels are used to power artificial intelligence.

The Battle for Digital Infrastructure

But the technological stakes are not limited to energy. There is also the issue of digital infrastructure. Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has built 5G networks in several Latin American countries. These networks are at the heart of the modern digital economy—they enable the Internet of Things, smart cities, telemedicine, and online education. But they also pose a potential security risk. The United States accuses Huawei of being a Trojan horse for the Chinese government, capable of spying on communications or sabotaging networks in the event of a conflict. Washington is pressuring Latin American countries to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks and turn to Western providers such as Ericsson or Nokia.

The problem is that Huawei often offers more competitive prices and cutting-edge technology. For countries with limited budgets, this is a compelling argument. But accepting Huawei also means accepting technological dependence on China. And in a world where technology equals power, this dependence can become dangerous. It’s the same dilemma as with investments in physical infrastructure: Latin American countries must choose between attractive but risky Chinese offers and more expensive but potentially safer Western alternatives. And as always, no matter which choice they make, they end up displeasing one of the two superpowers.

We have truly entered a bizarre era. An era where oil is used to power artificial intelligence. Where telecommunications networks are becoming geopolitical weapons. Where every piece of infrastructure, every technology, every energy source is at stake in the confrontation between superpowers. Nothing is neutral anymore. Nothing is apolitical. Everything is strategic. Everything is militarized. And the countries of Latin America, like all other countries in the Global South, are caught in the middle of this technological storm that they did not create and do not control.

Section 11: The Global South Facing New Spheres of Influence

China is positioning itself as the leader of the Global South

Amid all this chaos, China is trying to position itself as the leader of the Global South—that vast coalition of developing countries that reject Western hegemony and seek a more equitable world order. It’s a powerful narrative, especially in Latin America, where memories of U.S. interventions are still fresh. Beijing presents itself as a partner that respects sovereignty, does not lecture on democracy, and offers development aid without political strings attached. Above all, it portrays itself as a country that dares to stand up to the United States. Following the intervention in Venezuela, many Chinese people—and not just the government—feel that their country is defending small nations against American imperialism. That China is on the right side of history.

It’s a seductive narrative, but it’s also deeply hypocritical. Because China isn’t really defending the sovereignty of small countries—it’s defending its own interests. When it’s in its interest to respect sovereignty, it does so. When it isn’t, it doesn’t hesitate to exert massive economic pressure. Just ask the Philippines, Australia, and Lithuania—all have faced Chinese economic retaliation for taking positions that Beijing didn’t like. China is no less imperialist than the United States. It’s just imperialist in a different way—more subtle, more economic than military. But in the end, it’s still imperialism.

The Multipolar World Order: Dream or Nightmare?

Many countries in the Global South dream of a multipolar world order where no single superpower would dominate alone, where decisions would be made collectively, and where small countries would have a say. It’s an understandable dream after decades of American domination. But the reality of a multipolar world could be far worse than a unipolar one. Because a multipolar world is one where several major powers vie for influence, where smaller countries are constantly caught in the crossfire, and where there are no longer clear rules but only power dynamics. This is exactly what is happening in Latin America right now. And it is a nightmare for the countries in the region.

In a unipolar world dominated by the United States, at least the rules of the game were clear—even if they were unfair. In a multipolar world where the United States and China are fighting for influence, the rules are constantly changing, alliances are unstable, and pressure comes from all sides. Latin American countries are discovering that multipolarity isn’t synonymous with freedom—it’s just a different form of constraint. Instead of having a single master, they have two. And both are demanding, ruthless, and willing to do anything to win. The multipolar dream is turning into a multipolar nightmare.

I think back to all those discussions about the end of American hegemony, about the emergence of a fairer multipolar world. I believed in it, at one point. I told myself it couldn’t be worse than the unipolar world where the United States called the shots. But now, seeing what’s happening in Latin America, I wonder if we weren’t mistaken. Maybe a world with several superpowers fighting each other is worse than a world with a single dominant superpower. At least with just one, you know what to expect. With several, you’re just collateral damage in their wars.

Conclusion: The Return of Empires and the End of Illusions

We have entered a new Cold War

We must face the facts: we have entered a new Cold War. Not the one of the 20th century with its nuclear missiles and Iron Curtain, but a 21st-century Cold War—economic, technological, and geopolitical. A war where the battlefields are ports, 5G networks, data centers, and lithium mines. A war where the weapons are investments, loans, sanctions, and tariffs. A war where Latin America, like so many other regions of the world, has become a battleground for two superpowers vying for global dominance. U.S. intervention in Venezuela was not an isolated incident—it was the beginning of a new phase in this confrontation. And Wang Yiwei’s words, calling the United States “pirates,” are not just a diplomatic insult—they are a warning.

China is not going to withdraw from Latin America. It has invested too much, has too much to lose, and has too many strategic interests at stake. But it will have to adapt its strategy in the face of a U.S. administration determined to drive it out of the Western Hemisphere. Beijing will likely strengthen its presence in countries where it is already well-established, diversify its investments to reduce its vulnerability, and, above all, use every economic and diplomatic lever at its disposal to counter U.S. pressure. For its part, the United States will continue to apply the Monroe Doctrine—perhaps not through systematic military interventions, but certainly through economic pressure, threats, and ultimatums. Venezuela was only the first act. Others will follow.

And where do the countries of Latin America fit into all this?

The real losers in this story are the Latin American countries. They had hoped to take advantage of the Sino-American rivalry to negotiate better terms, to play the two superpowers off against each other, and to gain greater autonomy. They are discovering that in a Cold War, there is no room for the neutral. They must choose a side. And whichever side they choose, they lose. Choosing the United States means giving up Chinese investments, cheap loans, and infrastructure projects. Choosing China means exposing themselves to U.S. sanctions, political pressure, and perhaps even military intervention. There is no good option. Just bad options and even worse ones.

So what should be done? Perhaps the only solution for Latin America is to stick together. To strengthen regional organizations like CELAC, to coordinate their positions vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and to negotiate collectively rather than individually. Because on their own, Latin American countries are weak. Together, they represent a market of 670 million people, immense natural resources, and a strategic geographic position. Together, they could have real bargaining power. But to achieve that, they would have to overcome internal divisions, historical rivalries, and ideological differences. And frankly, given the region’s current state, that seems unlikely. So they will likely continue to be pawns in a game beyond their control, collateral victims of a war they did not choose.

I end this article with a sense of sadness. Sadness for Latin America, caught between two empires that see it as nothing more than a playground. Sadness for a world order that seemed to be moving toward greater cooperation but is now regressing to the law of the jungle. Sadness for all the illusions we once had—that globalization would bring peace, that economic interdependence would prevent conflicts, that the 21st century would be different from the 20th. We were wrong. The empires are back. Spheres of influence are back. The logic of domination is back. And we, powerless spectators of this great geopolitical game, can only watch and hope that it doesn’t end too badly. But deep down, we all know how Cold Wars end. Not well. Never well.

Sources

Primary sources

NRK (Norsk rikskringkasting) – “Chinese Professor on the U.S.: They’re Acting Like Pirates ” – Interview with Professor Wang Yiwei of Renmin University – Published January 11, 2026 – https://www.nrk.no/urix/kinesisk-professor-om-usa–-de-oppforer-seg-som-pirater-1.17721153

The Guardian – “Trump’s attack leaves China worried about its interests in Venezuela” by Amy Hawkins – Published January 5, 2026 – https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/venezuela-trump-attack-china-interests-analysis

CNBC – “Op-ed: Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and China are headed for a clash in Latin America” by Dewardric L. McNeal – Published January 11, 2026 – https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/11/trump-venezuela-greenland-donroe-doctrine-china.html

U.S. National Security Strategy – Official White House document – Published in November 2025 – https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Secondary Sources

Reuters – “China’s Oil Investments in Venezuela” – Published January 5, 2026 – Analysis of Chinese investments in Venezuela’s oil sector

The Diplomat – “What the U.S. Intervention in Venezuela Means for China’s Presence in Latin America” – Published in January 2026 – Geopolitical analysis of the impact of U.S. intervention

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – “China’s Influence in Latin America” – Report on Chinese investments and influence in the region – Data updated in 2025

AidData (William and Mary University) – “China’s Massive Overseas Lending Portfolio” – Study on Chinese overseas lending between 2000 and 2023 – Published in 2024

Americas Quarterly – “Colombia’s China Pivot Raises U.S. Concerns” by Luis Fernando Mejía – Published in summer 2025 – Analysis of Colombia’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative

BBC News – “Trump’s Panama Canal claims” – Published in January 2026 – Coverage of Trump’s statements on the Panama Canal

This content was created with the help of AI.

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