Electricity: The Lifeblood of Nuclear Power
To understand the gravity of the situation, one must grasp the crucial role of electricity in a nuclear facility—even a shut-down plant like Chernobyl. Contrary to what one might think, shutting down the reactors does not mean the danger is over. Spent fuel continues to generate heat through radioactive decay—heat that must be constantly removed to prevent a catastrophe. Currently, 20,000 spent fuel assemblies are stored in the site’s storage pool, the ISF-1 facility. This fuel, which was used in the reactors before they were shut down more than 20 years ago, is still radioactive and emits heat. It is stored in a pool—a basin filled with water—to be cooled. Once its radioactivity and thermal output have decreased sufficiently, after a few years, it can be transferred to dry storage facilities such as ISF-2.
Electricity is essential for several critical functions. It powers the pumps that circulate and clean the pool water and replenish the system with cold water. Without electricity, these pumps stop. The water will gradually heat up and could, in theory, begin to evaporate, along with certain radioactive isotopes present in the water. It’s a slow but inexorable process—like a silent countdown. The ventilation systems of the containment arch built in 2017 around the damaged reactor are also backed up by two dedicated generators. In the event of a total loss of power, the facility’s containment would rely solely on the structural integrity of the containment structure itself. A risky gamble.
It is this total dependence on electricity that terrifies me. We have built monsters that we can control only with wires, cables, and circuits. Cut one of them, and the monster awakens. I think of this magnificent yet fragile engineering, these redundant safety systems that give us the illusion of control. And then a war, a human folly, and everything comes crashing down. It’s the arrogance of technology that has led us here—this belief that we can tame the atom. The atom scoffs at our engineers, our systems, our safety measures. It’s just waiting for us to fail. And on March 9, we came dangerously close to that failure.
Emergency generators: a last line of defense
Faced with this external power outage, the Chernobyl site was not entirely helpless. The safety systems at the ISF-1 underwater storage facility are backed up by two diesel generators with a fuel supply sufficient for 48 hours. That’s short. Very short. These emergency generators are designed as a temporary measure—a lifeline until the main power supply is restored. But in the context of war, how can we guarantee that diesel fuel will be delivered? How can we ensure that technical crews will be able to access the site to refuel the generators? Operations to dismantle the sarcophagus surrounding the damaged reactor have likely been suspended due to the conflict, which means that the static containment must be sufficient to prevent releases into the environment. This containment system has never been tested under such extreme conditions.
Studies conducted after the Fukushima Daiichi accident on the consequences of a total loss of pool cooling show a slow rise in pool water temperature to around 60°C but no loss of water from the fuel assemblies. In other words, no radioactive release into the environment at this stage. This is reassuring, of course, but it is like saying that a fire has not yet spread. The IRSN specifies that the ISF-2 dry storage facility poses no risk in the event of a total loss of power, as the removal of heat from the fuel assemblies is fully ensured through passive means. However, only about 2,000 assemblies are reported to have been transferred from ISF-1 to ISF-2. The remaining 18,000 are still in the cooling pool, which relies on electricity. That’s 18,000 reasons for concern.
Section 2: The Specter of Fukushima Looming Over Europe
Lessons Not Learned
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident changed our understanding of nuclear risks. We learned that even after a reactor is shut down, the danger persists. We discovered that spent fuel storage pools could become critical points in the event of a power loss. Post-Fukushima studies have shown the slow rise in temperature of the water in these pools without active cooling. This rise may seem insignificant—60°C isn’t that hot—but it masks complex and potentially dangerous processes. The gradual evaporation of the water could expose the fuel assemblies, causing them to overheat and potentially melt down. It is this worst-case scenario that engineers around the world have spent years modeling, calculating, and dreading.
But Chernobyl is different from Fukushima. The fuel stored at Chernobyl has had decades to cool. The IAEA assures that “the thermal load of the pool and the volume of cooling water are sufficient to ensure effective heat removal without electricity.” Claire Corkhill, a professor at the University of Sheffield specializing in the degradation of nuclear materials, responded on Twitter, calling this assessment “understandable given the age of the nuclear fuel” and noting that it “significantly reduces the risk of contamination inside the building.” That’s true. Time has worked in our favor. The fuel has cooled. But is that a reason to let our guard down? To accept that nuclear sites could be held hostage in military conflicts?
Fukushima promised us this would never happen again. That after the lessons from Japan, every plant would be protected, every pool equipped with fail-safe backup systems. And now history is repeating itself—but this time it’s worse. This isn’t a natural tsunami; it’s a war waged by humans. It’s one human being attacking another, with nuclear power held hostage. I feel this simmering anger rising within me when I think of those lessons that were ignored. How many times must we be struck before we understand? Nuclear power and war are the most toxic cocktail humanity has ever invented. And we’re sitting on this powder keg, pretending that everything will be fine because studies say the risk is “reduced.” Reduced, not eliminated. Reduced, but still enough to kill.
Section 3: Humanity Held Hostage
The 200 people trapped in the area
Beyond the technical aspects, there is a human dimension that is particularly troubling. The IAEA has reiterated its concern about the “stressful and particularly difficult” situation of the approximately 200 people working at the site. These technicians, engineers, security guards, and maintenance staff have been unable to leave the premises since Russian armed forces took control of the zone on February 24, 2022. Imagine their situation. You’re working in one of the most radioactive places on the planet, monitoring deadly materials, and suddenly your country is invaded. Your site is occupied. You’re trapped. You can’t go home. You can’t communicate freely. And now, the power is out. How do you cope with the stress? How do you know when your shift will end? How do you know if you’ll ever see your family again?
These 200 people have become unwitting hostages in a war that defies comprehension. They are not soldiers. They are not politicians. They are technicians doing their jobs—jobs that are essential to the security of all of Europe. Without them, without their expertise, without their dedication, the situation could become catastrophic within hours. Yet they are being treated like pawns on a geopolitical chessboard. The IAEA has highlighted the particularly grueling working conditions for these staff members, who are already severely strained by the ongoing events. That is an understatement. How can one be merely “strained” when your life, that of your family, and potentially that of millions of others depend on your ability to maintain systems in a hostile environment controlled by foreign forces?
These 200 people haunt me. I don’t know their names. I don’t know their faces. But I’ve carried them with me ever since I learned of their situation. I think of that female engineer who doesn’t know if her children are safe. Of that security guard who wonders if he’ll ever see his home again. Of that technician who must make impossible choices—between obeying the Russian occupiers and protecting the integrity of the facility. It is humanity held hostage by the madness of men. How can we accept this? How can we leave innocent people trapped in this radioactive zone, caught in the crossfire? Every hour that passes, every day that goes by without them being able to leave, is a collective moral failure. We should all be ashamed.
Decommissioning on Hold
The loss of power is also affecting ongoing operations at the site. The temporary sarcophagus, hastily constructed after the 1986 accident, is currently being dismantled. This sarcophagus, which has contained radiation for decades, is fragile. Its structural deterioration justified the construction of a new containment arch, completed in 2017. This immense structure—250 meters wide, 160 meters long, and 100 meters high—was intended to enable the safe dismantling of the original sarcophagus and the remaining fuel. But these operations have been suspended due to the conflict. The dismantling of the sarcophagus surrounding the damaged reactor has likely been halted. This static containment structure must now be sufficient to prevent releases into the environment.
According to the IRSN, the loss of power to the site does not pose a risk of releases into the environment, but it does result in the loss of control and monitoring of the facilities. All technical data used for real-time monitoring of the facilities—water level, temperature, radioactivity—as well as the alarm system are no longer available. This could delay staff response in the event of an incident at a facility. The loss of power would also result in the loss of lighting, heating, and certain means of communication, leading to a deterioration in working conditions for staff, who are already under significant strain due to the ongoing events. It’s a chain reaction: no electricity, no monitoring, no alarms, no heating, no communication. Safety is eroding, layer by layer.
Section 4: Technological Blindness
Monitoring the invisible becomes impossible
One of the most alarming aspects of this power outage is the loss of monitoring capabilities. In a nuclear facility, measuring instruments serve as the operators’ eyes and ears. They provide real-time information on water levels in the pools, fuel temperature, radiation levels, and the status of cooling systems. Without electricity, these instruments fall silent. Data is no longer transmitted. Alarms no longer sound. Operators are plunged into total technological blindness. They can no longer see what is happening in inaccessible parts of the site. They can no longer tell if a leak is developing, if the temperature is rising abnormally, or if something is starting to go wrong.
Remote data transmission from the radiation level monitoring systems is also interrupted. It is therefore impossible to track what is happening on-site from the outside. Ukrainian and international experts are deprived of their assessment tools. They must rely on communications with the 200 technicians present on-site, who are themselves in a precarious situation. This lack of monitoring creates an information vacuum that can be dangerous. How can we make informed decisions without data? How can we assess risks without measurements? How can we know when a situation becomes critical without indicators? It’s like flying a plane in the dark without instruments. You hope everything is okay, but you can’t verify it. And if something goes wrong, you might not find out until it’s too late.
This idea of no longer being able to see, no longer being able to monitor—it terrifies me. We’ve built our safety systems around surveillance, measurement, and control. And suddenly, all of that vanishes. We find ourselves like blind people in a minefield, waiting for the click under our feet. It’s this powerlessness that revolts me. We’ve developed incredible technologies to measure the invisible, detect the undetectable, and monitor the unmonitorable. And a war—a war from another century—is taking us back to the Stone Age of nuclear security. I wonder what those technicians in that darkened control room are feeling. Do they have flashlights? Phones? How do they know everything’s okay? Or are they praying—simply praying—that the water won’t evaporate, that the pumps will restart, that the disaster will wait just a little longer?
Section 5: Russia's Game with Nuclear Fire
Occupation as a Weapon
The takeover of the Chernobyl site by Russian forces on February 24, 2022, is part of a broader strategy. Ukrainian nuclear facilities have become military targets. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, has also been occupied. This is a new form of warfare: the taking of critical infrastructure hostage. The Russians are using these sites as human shields, knowing that Ukrainian forces cannot bomb nuclear facilities without risking a major environmental disaster. It is a cynical and dangerous strategy. By occupying Chernobyl, the Russians know they hold a piece of radioactive history that can serve as a bargaining chip. They also know that any attack on the site could have consequences far beyond Ukraine’s borders.
The loss of external power is likely not an accident, but a direct consequence of Russian military operations in the region. Power lines have been damaged by the fighting. This is yet another act of violence in an already brutal war: violence against the infrastructure that supports nuclear safety. The Russians bear a special responsibility as occupiers. Under international law, an occupying power has an obligation to ensure the safety of civilian facilities and the civilian population. By leaving the site without power, endangering the 200 Ukrainian technicians, and risking a nuclear disaster, they are violating these obligations. But international law seems rather weak in the face of tanks and missiles.
Calculated Irresponsibility
What is particularly striking about this situation is the level of irresponsibility. Not only are Russian forces occupying a nuclear site, but they are actively creating the conditions for an accident. The power outage is not an inevitable collateral consequence; it is a strategic choice that endangers millions of people. Experts around the world have sounded the alarm. The IAEA has denounced the violation of nuclear safety principles. Environmental organizations have expressed their concern. Yet the occupation continues. The fighting continues. The risks are mounting.
There is something disturbing about this ability to play with nuclear fire as if it were merely a pawn on a chessboard. The political and military leaders making these decisions will likely live long enough to see the consequences of their actions. But it is the people who will bear the brunt of it. It is the children of Kyiv, Minsk, Warsaw, and Berlin who could inhale radioactive particles if something goes wrong at Chernobyl. It is this disconnect between decision-makers and those who suffer the consequences that revolts me. A disconnect amplified by the invisible nature of the radioactive threat. You can’t see radiation. You can’t smell it. But it’s there, ready to spread like a silent poison.
I wonder what goes through the minds of those who order these operations. Have they ever seen photos of the victims of Chernobyl? Have they read the testimonies of the liquidators? Do they understand what a nuclear disaster really means? Or is it just numbers, calculations, and probabilities to them? I have this haunting image of generals in comfortable bunkers, looking at maps with little arrows, without ever thinking about the people living around these sites, the children playing in the parks, the families trying to live normal lives despite the war. It’s this detachment—this lack of human connection—that allows the worst to happen. You can’t do this kind of thing if you’re truly connected to the people you’re putting at risk.
Section 6: The Lessons of 1986 and Collective Amnesia
History Repeats Itself
Chernobyl 1986. Chernobyl 2022. The same name, the same place, but a new nightmare. The 1986 accident left an indelible scar on humanity. We saw the images of evacuated towns, soldiers sent to their deaths, and contaminated children. We learned what the term “exclusion zone” truly meant. We promised it would never happen again. That lessons had been learned. That nuclear safety had been rethought, strengthened, transformed. And yet, here is Chernobyl, haunting us once more. Not because of a technical error, not because of a design flaw, but because of war. War, that other destructive human invention.
What is particularly ironic is that the Chernobyl site has become a symbol of the dangers of nuclear power. Millions of virtual visitors have discovered it through HBO’s series “Chernobyl.” Documentaries have been made, books written, and conferences organized. We have collectively mourned this accident and incorporated it into our historical consciousness. But we have not learned the fundamental lesson: nuclear power and war cannot coexist. Nuclear power requires stability, predictability, and control—all of which war inevitably destroys. By occupying Chernobyl and jeopardizing its safety systems, Russian forces have reminded us that the lessons of the past are quickly forgotten when conflict breaks out.
The Vulnerability of Nuclear Facilities
This incident reveals an uncomfortable truth: our nuclear facilities are vulnerable. Not vulnerable to sophisticated terrorist attacks, not vulnerable to complex cyberattacks, but vulnerable to something as mundane as a power outage in the context of war. We have built power plants with redundant safety systems, multiple physical barriers, and detailed emergency protocols. But all of this rests on a fundamental assumption: continuous access to electricity. This is the Achilles’ heel of modern nuclear power. Without electricity, even the safest plant becomes a ticking time bomb.
And this isn’t just true for Chernobyl. All nuclear power plants around the world depend on electricity for their safety systems. Cooling systems, pumps, fans, measuring instruments—everything requires electricity. Emergency generators exist, but they have limited runtime. Fuel reserves aren’t infinite. In a prolonged conflict or a major crisis, how can we guarantee that electricity will continue to flow? How can we ensure that fuel will be delivered? How can we keep crews on site? There are no simple answers to these questions, but they must be asked. The Chernobyl incident reminded us that nuclear safety is not an absolute guarantee, but a fragile balance that can be disrupted by external forces.
This vulnerability terrifies me because it is universal. All of our power plants, all of our nuclear sites, everywhere in the world, are potentially vulnerable to this type of scenario. A war, a natural disaster, a major power grid failure—and the balance is shattered. We live with this illusion of safety, this belief that our technologies protect us, that our infallible systems will save us. But the reality is different. Safety is a fragile construct, a house of cards that can collapse at the first gust of strong wind. And in Chernobyl, that wind is blowing hard.
Section 7: Into the Nuclear Unknown
The Uncertainty of the Days Ahead
As I write this, the situation in Chernobyl remains uncertain. The diesel generators may still have fuel. Or perhaps they’ve run dry. Electricity may have been restored. Or perhaps the site is still in the dark. Ukrainian technicians may still be on site. Or perhaps they have been replaced by Russian personnel. The information is fragmented, difficult to verify, and subject to war propaganda. What is certain is that the risk persists. Every day that passes without a clear resolution to the situation is a day when the risk of an accident increases. Every day that the monitoring systems remain inactive is a day when a malfunction could go unnoticed until it is too late.
The IAEA continues to monitor the situation closely, but its access to the site is limited. Ukrainian experts remain in contact with on-site personnel, but their communications are restricted. The international community is expressing concern, but its ability to act is limited. We are in a state of limbo—an agonizing wait where time is working against us. Safety systems are not designed to operate indefinitely without maintenance. Fuel reserves are not infinite. The human capacity to manage extreme crisis situations has its limits. And at Chernobyl, all of these limits are being tested simultaneously.
Possible Scenarios
Faced with this uncertainty, experts are considering several scenarios. The best-case scenario: electricity is restored quickly, the backup generators do not need to run for long, the monitoring systems resume normal operation, and no incidents occur. This is the scenario we all hope for—the one that minimizes risks and protects the population. The intermediate scenario: power remains out longer than expected, the diesel generators run continuously, fuel is delivered irregularly, working conditions for staff deteriorate, but no major accidents occur. This is the scenario that makes us sweat but remains manageable.
The worst-case scenario: power is not restored, the diesel generators break down, fuel is no longer available, the cooling systems shut down, the temperature in the pools rises, the water evaporates, the fuel assemblies are exposed, a reaction begins, and radioactive releases occur. This is the nightmare scenario—the one no one wants to consider but which remains technically possible. It is this scenario that drives us to act, to demand information, and to seek solutions. Because even if the probability is low, the cost in human lives would be unacceptable.
Conclusion: The Moment of Truth
A Call to Global Conscience
The Chernobyl incident on March 9, 2022, is not merely a technical event; it is a potential crime against humanity. It proves that nuclear power and war cannot coexist, that civilian facilities cannot be used as weapons, and that nuclear safety must be upheld even in times of conflict. The international community has an obligation to respond, to demand the protection of Ukraine’s nuclear sites, to ensure the safety of the personnel working there, and to guarantee that safety systems remain operational. This is not just a matter of diplomacy; it is a matter of survival.
We have a duty to remember the lessons of 1986. We have a responsibility to protect future generations from the consequences of another nuclear accident. We have the power to expose the irresponsibility of those who take unacceptable risks with human lives. Chernobyl is not just a nuclear site; it is a symbol. A symbol of what can happen when humanity loses its sense of limits, when technology spirals out of control, when war destroys what should be protected. We cannot allow this symbol to become a new tragedy.
I write these words with a sense of urgency that tightens my throat, with the certainty that we are at a tipping point. Not just for Ukraine, but for all of humanity. If we allow Chernobyl to once again become a source of death and contamination, if we accept that nuclear power is being exploited for war, then we have lost everything. We have lost our humanity. We have lost our moral compass. We have lost the right to call ourselves civilized. I ask everyone reading these lines not to forget. Not to let our attention wane when the headlines change. To continue to be outraged, to demand answers, to refuse to accept the unacceptable. Because what is happening in Chernobyl is our history being written. And it is up to us to decide how it will end.
Sources
Primary sources
CRIIRAD – March 9, 2022: Total loss of external power supply at the Chernobyl site – Essential safety functions now depend on diesel generators
IRSN/ASNR – March 10, 2022: Ukraine: Situation at the Chernobyl site as of March 10, 2022
Le Monde – March 9, 2022: Chernobyl: Nuclear power plant site disconnected from the power grid; “no major impact” at this stage, according to the IAEA
Secondary Sources
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – March 2022 statements regarding the situation in Chernobyl
Energoatom – March 2022 press releases on the loss of power at the Chernobyl site
SNRIU (Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority) – Information on the situation in Chernobyl
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