REPORT: Ankara Goes on High Alert — 70,000 Officers, Red Zones, and an Airport Reinforced for NATO

Jacques Pj Provost

2026-06-21 17:54:05

A force that surpasses the armies of many NATO allies

The most striking figure, according to sources familiar with the matter cited by Bloomberg on June 19, 2026, is this: approximately 70,000 law enforcement officers—uniformed police, plainclothes police, and gendarmes—will be stationed in Ankara to ensure security for the summit. The Anadolu Agency, for its part, had initially reported a figure of 40,000 police officers and gendarmes on June 12, a figure confirmed by the Daily Sabah, suggesting that the total number of personnel—including reinforcements and additional specialized units—far exceeds that baseline.

Bloomberg does not mince words: this security force surpasses the military capabilities of many Alliance member nations. To put things in perspective, several NATO countries do not have 70,000 troops under arms. Turkey alone is mobilizing a full army for two days. The personnel will include uniformed units, plainclothes teams mingling with the crowd, anti-drone systems, bomb disposal units, and rapid response forces.

Turkey’s Interior Ministry in Full Mobilization Mode

On May 25, Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi chaired a meeting of senior security officials dedicated to the summit. The General Directorate of Security and the General Command of the Gendarmerie presented their plans at the meeting. Çiftçi stated: “We are meticulously carrying out all our preparations to ensure that this important meeting, hosted by our country, takes place in peace and security.”

In addition to personnel, Turkish authorities will deploy a network of surveillance cameras at 100 additional critical locations, supplementing the existing urban video surveillance network. These new high-tech cameras, referred to as “observer cams” in official documents, will be added to the CCTV cameras already installed throughout the capital. Electronic surveillance, radio signal restrictions, and airspace monitoring round out this multi-layered security network.

Seventy thousand officers. The number echoes in my head like a collective admission of the state of the world. You don’t mobilize such a force for a rutabaga summit—you do it because the threats are real, hybrid, and unpredictable, and because the presence of Trump, his ally Zelensky, and decision-makers from 32 nations in a single location creates a target that the West’s enemies would dream of striking. I understand the scale of it. I respect it.

Red Zones: Ankara Divided into Sectors Under Full Control

The Geography of Restrictions in the Heart of the Capital

Ankara’s public spaces will be literally redrawn on July 7 and 8. Turkish authorities have designated several areas as “red zones”—areas with highly restricted access for pedestrians and vehicles. According to the Anadolu Agency, the red zones include: the area surrounding Esenboğa Airport; the Söğütözü neighborhood, where the presidential complex is located; the official routes used by motorcades; and the areas surrounding the 15 hotels hosting the delegations.

These 15 hotels—including the Meyra Palace, the Radisson Blu, the Four Points Flex by Sheraton, and the Holiday Inn Çukurambar, as mentioned in NATO’s media advisory—will host thousands of diplomats, advisors, bodyguards, and accredited journalists. Each of these establishments is subject to floor-by-floor security systems, electronic surveillance infrastructure, and controlled-access measures. In short, the hotel is no longer just a hotel: it is a secure annex of the summit.

The ban on demonstrations: a 15-day freeze on public spaces

The most visible aspect for ordinary Ankarans remains the ban on all demonstrations and public gatherings in Ankara from July 1 to 15. Fifteen days. Half a lunar cycle during which the Turkish capital is living under a state of civil emergency. Turkish authorities have also announced that they will share information with other countries regarding individuals likely to attempt protest actions—those who are the subject of intelligence reports will not be allowed to enter the capital.

Civil servants in nine districts of Ankara will be granted administrative leave from July 6 to 12, with the exception of those mobilized for the summit or for essential services. Even exams are affected: the ÖSYM has postponed the entrance exam for the Ministry of Education’s Academy from July 12 to July 26, and the academic staff exam to August 2. The message is clear—during the week of the summit, Ankara belongs to NATO.

The 15-day ban on demonstrations leaves me with mixed feelings. I understand the impeccable security logic behind it. But there is something unsettling about the idea of suspending civil liberties to host an alliance whose very purpose is to defend those very freedoms. I’m not saying it’s a mistake—I’m saying it’s a real tension, and we need to acknowledge it honestly.

Etimesgut: A Military Airfield Converted into a VIP Hub for the Alliance

Eight months of construction to accommodate 44 aircraft simultaneously

One of the most iconic projects in these preparations is the Etimesgut Airport, a former military base west of Ankara. During eight months of intensive renovation, its runways were extended and its infrastructure modernized to accommodate large VIP aircraft. Its new capacity: 44 aircraft simultaneously in its parking areas. A new secure VIP terminal, additional hangars, and modernized radar and air traffic control systems—the former military airfield has been transformed into a state airport capable of hosting the presidential jets of 32 allied nations.

President Erdoğan himself made the inaugural flight from Istanbul to this airport, which will be officially renamed Ankara Airport. According to the Daily Sabah, its role is clear: to relieve Esenboğa Airport of the massive traffic generated by the summit, while serving as an exclusive hub for official delegations. Esenboğa, for its part, will see its international flights restricted for the duration of the event.

Airspace Under Sovereign and Allied Control

The management of Ankara’s airspace during the summit is itself an extraordinary coordination effort. NATO security coordination teams are working in conjunction with Turkish agencies to orchestrate the delegations’ arrivals and departures. Restrictions on civilian flights, anti-drone surveillance, and controlled airspace operations round out the picture. To borrow the phrasing from the Eurasian Review’s analysis of May 30, 2026, Etimesgut will serve as a strategic logistics hub, enabling the simultaneous management of military, diplomatic, and government aircraft.

Security checkpoints will be set up on all major access roads to Ankara. On the morning of July 7, access from the security zone along the roads to the Media Center located at the Presidential National Library (Millet Kütüphanesi) will be possible only via official shuttle. Even accredited journalists will be able to travel only by shuttle. The capital will be under total lockdown.

Etimesgut fascinates me. Transforming a military base into a diplomatic airport in eight months is a demonstration of operational capability that speaks volumes about what Turkey is today: a country that can—when it decides to—deploy impressive logistical power. Erdoğan has long understood that the host of a major summit is not just a logistics expert: he is a political actor in his own right.

Beştepe: The Presidential Complex at the Center of the World

Erdoğan’s Palace as the Alliance’s Global Stage

The Beştepe presidential complex, officially known as the Külliye, will be the beating heart of the summit. This architectural colossus, inaugurated in 2014 in the hills west of Ankara, will become—for 48 hours—the place where the West’s collective response to current threats will be forged—or fractured. The summit will officially open there on July 7 and conclude on the afternoon of July 8.

The complex will feature redesigned, secure conference rooms; an International Media Center operating out of the adjacent Presidential National Library; advanced simultaneous translation systems; enhanced cybersecurity infrastructure; and secure corridors dedicated to the movement of heads of state. The renovation work was carried out in parallel with construction projects in Etimesgut and at the designated hotels—a massive upgrade operation spanning the entire capital.

The International Media Center: 1,500 journalists under full surveillance

NATO has set up an International Media Center (IMC) for accredited journalists, featuring some 1,500 workstations, 40 editing suites, a fully equipped TV studio, outdoor positions overlooking the Külliye, and a large 500-seat press theater. TRT, the Turkish public broadcaster, will serve as the summit’s host broadcaster. Video pools, live satellite broadcasts, and SRT feeds will enable real-time global coverage.

But covering this summit will be no walk in the park for journalists. Access to the CMI will be available only via official shuttle buses on July 7 and 8. No live broadcast vehicles will be permitted near the site except for the host broadcaster. All heavy equipment must be set up by 6 p.m. on July 6 at the latest. The deadline for accreditation has been set for June 7, 2026—latecomers won’t stand a chance.

My thoughts go out to my colleagues who will be covering this event under these conditions. Freedom of the press hasn’t been abolished, but it is strictly regulated. We can understand the security constraints. What concerns me more is that this coverage under total control inevitably produces a sanitized, official, and managed image. The real news from Ankara that week will likely unfold in the hallways, during unofficial bilateral meetings, and in midnight conversations among advisors. And those moments—no one will see them.

The Defense Industry Forum: The Other Summit Within the Summit

SMEs and Startups Alongside Defense Ministers

In parallel with the heads of state sessions, NATO will host the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum. According to NATO’s official media advisory dated April 22, 2026, the goal is to facilitate high-level engagement between NATO, allied ministers, government representatives, and leaders from the defense and non-defense industries, including SMEs and startups. This format is significant: NATO seeks to ground its strategic thinking in concrete industrial realities, recognizing that the war in Ukraine has exposed urgent capability gaps.

Minister Güler himself mentioned this forum in his remarks, noting that several NATO counterparts had specifically requested to expand defense industry ties with Ankara during bilateral meetings in Brussels. Turkey, with its rapidly expanding defense industrial base—led by Bayraktar drones—is positioning itself as a credible industrial partner, complementary rather than redundant to major U.S. and European contractors.

Turkey, a Military-Industrial Power at the Heart of the Alliance

Güler was explicit during the Brussels meetings: “Our indigenous and national systems support allied interoperability and contribute to the Alliance’s overall deterrence. A strong defense industry means strong deterrence and a strong NATO.” This is a declaration of power. Turkey no longer wants to be merely a contributor of forces—it wants to be recognized as a nation that shapes the Alliance’s industrial capacity.

The Atlantic Council, in its April 20, 2026, analysis, emphasizes that the 5% of GDP defense spending target adopted in The Hague in 2025 has opened a considerable window of industrial opportunity. Countries such as Poland, Romania, Germany, and Finland are signing massive arms contracts. The Ankara Forum will provide an opportunity to match these equipment needs with available production capacities—including those in Turkey.

The Defense Industry Forum may be the least glamorous part of this summit—but it is the one that will have the most lasting impact. The defense SMEs and startups that sign contracts in Ankara this July will be the ones manufacturing the drones, ammunition, and sensors that will equip NATO’s armed forces in ten years. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to fight. The two are deeply—and often underestimated—interconnected.

Güler: “Ankara isn’t on the outskirts—it’s at the center”

A Minister Who Speaks on Equal Terms with Washington

Yasar Güler is not one for diplomatic modesty. When interviewed in Brussels on the sidelines of the NATO defense ministers’ meeting, he made a statement that sums up the Turkish mindset well: “There is now a very clear reality: Turkey is not on the periphery of the security architecture—it is at its center.” ” And this statement is not just empty rhetoric. Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO by size. It will soon assume command of the Allied Reaction Force.

Regarding the Ankara summit, Güler was even more direct: “We do not view the Ankara summit as merely a meeting of leaders. We believe it will mark a significant turning point, demonstrating NATO’s determination to adapt to the evolving security environment and shape its strategic direction for the future. ” He also outlined his country’s expectations: that the summit would strengthen the principles of collective defense and reaffirm the allies’ commitment to Article 5, the mutual defense clause.

Turkey at the Geostrategic Crossroads of the Alliance

Güler drove the point home by describing Turkey’s geographic and strategic position: “Stability in the Black Sea is inextricably linked to Euro-Atlantic security. ” He reaffirmed the application of the Montreux Convention and supported regional stability. On the issue of hybrid threats, he was explicit: conventional threats are “increasingly accompanied by hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and terrorism,” which require a strengthening of collective deterrence.

This picture does not obscure the persistent tensions—notably the criticism of the Franco-Cypriot agreement, which Güler described as an initiative “that lacks legitimacy, disrupts the delicate balance, and contravenes international law.” But in the context of the Ankara summit, these intra-Alliance frictions exist against the backdrop of a clear message: Turkey is indispensable to NATO, and it intends for everyone to know it.

I like it when Güler is direct. “Turkey is at the center, not on the periphery”—it’s clear, unapologetic, almost defiant compared to the usual diplomatic language. And he’s not entirely wrong. But I would have liked to hear him speak just as clearly on Ukraine. On this issue, Turkey is walking a tightrope that always makes me feel slightly uneasy—even if the role of mediator may have its strategic value.

Ukraine in the Room: The Hidden Agenda and the Central Issue

A summit taking place in the shadow of war

Delegations will arrive in Ankara with the war in Ukraine as a constant backdrop. In its May 30 analysis, The Eurasian Review lists the major issues on the agenda: the war in Ukraine, the European security architecture, instability in the Middle East, energy supply security, and defense industry cooperation. Support for Kyiv—financial, military, and diplomatic—will be one of the most closely scrutinized political indicators at the summit.

The Atlantic Council notes that at the 2025 summit in The Hague, Trump secured a commitment from allies to devote 5% of GDP to defense. Ankara must now demonstrate that this commitment is being fulfilled. Several Eastern allies—Poland foremost among them—are investing heavily in U.S. equipment: Apache helicopters, F-35s, Standard missiles, and AMRAAMs. These purchases are both an act of transatlantic solidarity and a means of strengthening the capacity to contain Russia.

Turkey Between Kyiv and Moscow: A Unique Position

Turkey maintains its unique position: it is a NATO member, it has supplied Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, but it has not joined the sanctions against Russia and continues to position itself as a potential mediator. Minister Fidan stated at a press conference on June 11: “We recommend that the parties cease hostilities, return to the negotiating table, and finalize the text (on a lasting peace) on which they are close to reaching an agreement.”

This stance of Turkish strategic pragmatism is not without merit—a channel of communication with Moscow serves a real purpose. But it also creates unease within an Alliance that, since February 2022, has chosen moral clarity: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine has the right to defend itself, and the allies have a duty to help it. The Ankara summit will be a test of NATO’s ability to manage these internal tensions while maintaining a united front against Putin.

Ukraine’s presence in the Ankara discussions will likely not be at the forefront—Zelensky is not a member of the Alliance, even though he aspires to be one. But any decision made in this presidential complex on July 7 or 8 will have repercussions on the front lines in the Donbas. It is a staggering responsibility that these men and women bear as they arrive at Beştepe. I hope they are fully aware of it.

Trump in Ankara: His First Visit to Erdoğan's Country

The First U.S. Presidential Visit to Turkey

U.S. President Donald Trump will make his first official trip to Turkey during this summit. This fact, reported by the Daily Sabah on June 4, is significant. Turkish-American relations have experienced significant turbulence—the F-35 and S-400 issues, tensions over the Syrian Kurds—but since Trump’s return in 2025, a pragmatic modus vivendi has taken hold. The Atlantic Council notes that Trump’s visit to Ankara ahead of the summit is part of a trend toward the gradual normalization of bilateral relations.

Trump and Erdoğan share a certain style—direct, nationalist, and wary of multilateral institutions unless they serve their interests. This personal affinity, whether genuine or for show, holds diplomatic value. The Atlantic Council emphasizes that the institutional leverage provided by the July 2026 NATO summit and Trump’s visit to Ankara present opportunities to transform the pragmatic foundations laid in 2025 into a more sustainable framework for cooperation.

A Refocused West, Turkey as an Indispensable Pivot

The Ankara summit also symbolizes a geopolitical reality that Europeans sometimes struggle to grasp: Turkey is an indispensable pivot. It controls the Straits, borders the Black Sea, shares a border with Syria and Iraq, and is within striking distance of Iran. Güler leaves no doubt about this: “With its military capability, operational experience, and leadership responsibilities, (Turkey) is among the leading nations shaping the Alliance’s deterrence, resilience, and future.”

For the West, fully integrating Turkey into the Alliance’s strategic vision—including by accepting its contradictions, its own interests, and its ambiguities—is an ongoing challenge. But refusing to integrate Turkey would be far more costly. The Ankara summit is an opportunity to reaffirm that NATO is an alliance of diversity, not a club of homogeneous values, but one united by a common interest in collective security.

Trump in Ankara for the first time. Erdoğan welcoming him to his palace. It’s a powerful image. Trump is a necessary evil for the West—I stand by that assessment. He has forced Europe to wake up to the reality of defense, he has increased pressure on Alliance funding, and he has achieved what decades of soft diplomacy failed to do. But I also haven’t forgotten the institutional fragility he represents. In Ankara, the 32 allies need America to be there—fully, even if imperfectly.

The National Library as a Media Bunker

1,500 seats, no access without a badge

The media logistics for this summit are a subject of study in and of themselves. The International Media Center (CMI) will be set up at the Presidential National Library, a few hundred meters from Beştepe. Capacity: approximately 1,500 workstations, 40 editing suites, a fully equipped TV studio for live broadcasts, a large 500-seat press theater, and outdoor booths overlooking the presidential complex. The facility will operate continuously from July 5 through the morning of July 9, with tea, coffee, and hot meals included—free of charge.

Journalists were required to obtain accreditation by June 7, 2026. Late applicants will not be accommodated. Heavy cameras, technical equipment—everything had to be set up by 6:00 p.m. on July 6 at the latest. Live broadcast vehicles will not be permitted near the site, except for TRT. Broadcasters wishing to have a continuous live feed must reserve their stand-up spot at [email protected] by June 30. Coverage is organized, structured, and channeled—which results in efficient but formulaic coverage.

The photo pool: an accepted constraint in the battle for images

NATO has established a visual pool system for journalists. Any organization accepting a pool position must immediately share its material with all accredited media outlets that request it, free of charge and without restrictions on its use for journalistic purposes. This material may not be sold. It must be identified as pool material whenever it is used. NATO and TRT, along with official photographers, will provide basic coverage of all public events.

Certain events will be covered only by the host broadcaster—a way to control the images that will circulate around the world. This image management is inherent to any summit of this level, but it serves as a reminder that the war of communication is also a dimension of collective security. At a time when Russian disinformation seeks to divide Western public opinion, a single image or a poorly edited soundbite can be turned into a narrative weapon.

I have a complex relationship with the logistics of media summits. Everything is planned, optimized, and controlled—which creates clarity but also leads to uniformity in coverage. The most powerful images and genuine moments often emerge on the fringes, not within the organized spaces. That said, in a context where enemy propaganda is active and sophisticated, a minimum of narrative discipline on the allied side seems to me not only understandable but necessary.

The 5% of GDP Challenge: Money as a Political Signal

The Grand Promise of The Hague and Its Landing in Ankara

The June 2025 summit in The Hague was historic for one reason: Trump secured a commitment from the allies to devote 5% of their GDP to defense and defense-related spending by 2030. This is an unprecedented commitment in the Alliance’s history since the Cold War. Ankara must now demonstrate that this commitment is more than just an empty promise. The Atlantic Council makes an explicit recommendation: rather than seeking another high-profile announcement, the Ankara summit should focus on the concrete implementation of this commitment.

The list of ongoing arms purchases in Europe speaks for itself. Poland is acquiring dozens of AH-64 Apache helicopters. Romania is purchasing F-35s. Denmark is ordering the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. Germany is investing in Standard and SM-2 missiles. Finland is purchasing more than 400 AMRAAM missiles. Beyond their operational value, these contracts send a strong political signal to Washington: Europe takes its defense seriously, and it is doing so with American equipment—something Trump particularly appreciates.

A military parade as a tangible symbol of Alliance solidarity

The Atlantic Council is proposing a bold idea for the summit: a parade of recently acquired military equipment through Ankara, followed by a static display. This parade would serve several purposes simultaneously: sending a deterrent signal to Russia, reassuring allied public opinion, allowing Trump to see the tangible results of his burden-sharing policy, and promoting the U.S. defense industry. Given the extremely tense security situation in Ankara in early July, the image of an allied armored column marching through the Turkish capital would carry powerful symbolic weight.

It remains to be seen whether this idea will gain traction. The logistics of such a parade in a city already transformed into a security fortress are considerable. But the intention is clear: to make this summit a moment of tangible and visible solidarity, not just a series of diplomatic communiqués. In 2026, after four years of war in Ukraine, NATO needs symbols that speak to citizens as much as they do to government officials.

The military parade: I like the idea more than I ever imagined I would. There is something powerful about the concrete manifestation of allied solidarity. Tanks, missiles, helicopters—these are tangible responses to Putin’s rhetoric about Western weakness. And if that appeals to Trump and makes him want to stay in the Alliance, then so much the better. We’ll take whatever leverage we can get.

Hybrid Security: Beyond People in Uniform

Cyber, drones, signals—the invisible threat

The 70,000 security personnel and physical “red zones” constitute only the visible layer of the security apparatus. Behind the scenes, a hybrid security architecture of rare sophistication is being deployed. The May 30 issue of The Eurasian Review details the components: anti-drone measures, electronic signal surveillance, reinforced special forces, mine-clearing and rapid-response units, and controlled airspace operations. Coordination involves NATO security teams in addition to Turkish agencies, as well as foreign protection units accompanying each national delegation.

The cyber threat is being taken seriously: both the presidential complex and the General Staff Headquarters have benefited from enhanced cybersecurity infrastructure. In 2026, a NATO summit is a natural target for espionage, disinformation, or digital sabotage operations. Russian, Iranian, and North Korean intelligence services have demonstrated their capabilities in this area. Summit security is therefore also an intelligence battle, one that plays out well before and well after the official 48-hour period.

Threats on the Access Roads to the Capital

On land routes, security checkpoints along the access roads to Ankara serve as a preventive screening measure. Turkish authorities have announced that they are in contact with their foreign counterparts to identify individuals likely to attempt protest actions during the summit—those who are the subject of intelligence reports will not be allowed to enter the capital during the summit period. While this procedure raises questions regarding individual freedoms, it reflects the actual level of vigilance maintained by the intelligence services.

The network of cameras at 100 additional critical locations complements the existing urban surveillance system. These high-tech “observer cams” enable real-time monitoring by dedicated teams. In a context where even a simple, unsupervised demonstration could be exploited by hostile actors, this level of surveillance can be seen as a proportionate response to a real threat—even if its use after the summit will warrant critical scrutiny.

Hybrid surveillance concerns me in the long term. Will what is deployed for a NATO summit in July 2026 remain in place solely for that summit? Cameras, intelligence protocols, anti-drone systems—once a city has equipped itself with these tools, it rarely simply puts them away in a closet. This is one of the fundamental tensions of our time: collective security requires tools that threaten individual freedoms. There is no simple answer to this.

NATO's Eastern Flank: 80,000 U.S. troops, eight combat teams

The deterrence architecture that the summit aims to strengthen

The Ankara summit is not taking place in a vacuum—it is part of a deterrence architecture currently undergoing restructuring. The Atlantic Council cites the figures: more than 80,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in Europe, the majority of whom were deployed to reinforce the eastern flank following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The eight Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battle groups deployed in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia total approximately 25,000 personnel.

The Atlantic Council’s recommendation for Ankara is clear: Western European allies must increase their contributions in each of the EFP countries, with the goal of reaching the equivalent of a fully operational combat brigade. This reinforcement is necessary not to replace the Americans—whose enabling role (strategic transport, missile defense, in-flight refueling, intelligence, satellites) remains irreplaceable in the short term—but to reduce dependence on a U.S. presence that could fluctuate depending on the whims of the White House.

The NATO Transition Planning Group: The Big Idea to Be Validated

The Atlantic Council’s most far-reaching proposal for the Ankara summit is the creation of a NATO Transition Planning Group, with U.S., European, and Canadian participation. Its mission: to coordinate the rebalancing of capabilities within the Alliance, set realistic timelines for the transfer to Europe of functions currently dominated by Washington, and address concrete questions about who will take on what, at what pace, and with what resources.

This group would not aim to accelerate the U.S. withdrawal, but rather to provide a predictable framework that reassures the allies most at risk in the east. In other words: to transform Trump’s realpolitik on defense spending into coherent strategic planning, rather than allowing the gap to widen between political rhetoric and the reality of capabilities on the ground. Rutte himself had called, on April 9 in Washington, for a shift from “unhealthy codependence to a healthy partnership.”

The NATO Transition Planning Group may be the best idea to come out of this summit—and probably the one that will receive the least media coverage, because it is too technical to make headlines. But it is this group that will determine whether, in five years, Europe can stand on its own without American crutches—or whether it will collapse at the first withdrawal of U.S. troops. I’d rather we build that foundation now than discover too late that we should have done so.

Conclusion: Ankara, the Provisional Capital of the Western Resistance

A Summit Commensurate with the Current Threats

On July 7 and 8, 2026, Ankara will not merely be the capital of Turkey. For two intense days, it will be the temporary capital of the West in resistance—resistance to Putin’s logic of conquest, resistance to the temptation to give up, and resistance to the erosion of transatlantic solidarity. The barricaded city, the restricted zones, the 70,000 security personnel, the renamed and expanded Etimesgut Airport—none of this is mere pomp and circumstance. It is the logistical embodiment of a conviction: NATO, in 2026, is an Alliance that deserves to be protected with an intensity commensurate with what it represents for liberal democracies.

Minister Güler put it with a candor I appreciate: this summit will be a turning point. A turning point in the reorganization of responsibilities within the Alliance, in the transatlantic rebalancing, in the recognition of Turkey’s role, and in the consolidation of support for Ukraine. These issues coexist, sometimes in tension, always in interaction. Such is the nature of an Alliance of 32 sovereign members, each with different histories and different neighbors.

The Alliance’s future is at stake in Beştepe

What the heads of state sign—or refuse to sign—at Beştepe on July 7 and 8 will provide the true measure of Allied cohesion in the face of Russia and its allies in the authoritarian axis. Support for Ukraine will be the litmus test. The implementation of the 5% of GDP target will be another. The possible creation of a Transition Planning Group will be a third test. And in the background, the silent battle for civil rights rages in a capital under maximum surveillance.

Ankara is barricading itself in. NATO is meeting. The world is watching. And somewhere in the trenches of eastern Ukraine, soldiers are holding their positions, hoping that this meeting will produce more than just words. I owe them at least that much: to state clearly that this summit has a moral responsibility toward them, not just strategic significance. The West must remain the center of the world—not because it deserves it by default, but because it has chosen the side of freedom—and because that choice comes at a cost: in commitment, in courage, and in defense spending.

Signed, Jacques Pj Provost, columnist